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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
EYEWITNESS CHOOSING BEHAVIOR: THE ROLE OF ECPHORIC EXPERIENCE
AND NON-MEMORIAL CUES
by
Brian S. Cahill
Florida International University, 2015
Miami, Florida
Professor Stephen D. Charman, Major Professor
Researchers’ attempts at understanding the processes underlying witness choosing
behavior have focused on applying models that predict that identifications will be
primarily driven by memorial factors. However, research has shown that several nonmemorial variables affect witness choosing behavior (e.g., administrator influence,
clothing bias, co-witness information); thus a full understanding of the processes
underlying witness choosing behavior needs to account for these effects. While the
memory-based models do attempt to provide explanations for the effects of nonmemorial based variables on choosing behavior they all do so within a memorial context.
However, I will argue a lineup task is not simply a memory task but a task that allows
both memorial and non-memorial variables to impact choosing behavior, with the latter
affecting choosing through an inferential process.
The purpose of the present study was to provide an initial test of a novel,
inferential based framework (i.e., the Competition/Corroboration Conceptualization). In
short, this framework predicts that the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior
will occur via leading witnesses to deliberatively infer who the suspect is, and that the
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extent to which a deliberative process is engaged is dependent upon the witnesses’
ecphoric experience.
Study 1 (N = 146) had mock-witnesses view several lineups with non-memorial
cues embedded in them; results showed that mock-witnesses engaged in an inferential
process by using the cues in the lineup to help guide their choosing behavior. Study 2 (N
= 376) had witnesses view either a target-present or target-absent lineup where a nonmemorial cue suggested that witnesses should either identify the target, identify a specific
filler, or was not included. Witnesses then made an identification decision. Results from
study 2 showed that the presence of a non-memorial cue suggesting the suspect’s guilt
increased suspect identifications compared to its absence, and importantly, that this effect
was greater for witnesses who had a weak ecphoric experience.
Findings across both studies suggest that an inferential based framework of
witness choosing more fully encompasses the underlying nature of witnesses’
phenomenological experience. Practical implications and future directions are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his seminal work, Hugo Münsterberg (1908) discussed many ways in which
psychology and the law come in contact, be it through the detection of deception, false
confessions, or, most relevant to this paper, eyewitness memory. Indeed, Münsterberg
was one of the earliest proponents of applying psychological findings to solve real-world
issues. And although he may be better known for his ideas regarding applied science, he
also viewed theoretical understanding as an important goal within science (Münsterberg,
1899). Since its beginning with Münsterberg’s work to contemporary times, the goal of
eyewitness researchers has been to empirically evaluate the factors that affect eyewitness
memory so we may positively contribute to the legal system. And after over 100 years of
empirical interest researchers have amassed a large corpus of research on eyewitness
memory and decision making and have made significant contributions to the legal system
leading to many positive changes that will ultimately lead to improved outcomes.
However, despite the many successes, the eyewitness identification field as a whole has
made relatively little theoretical progress in understanding the processes that underlie
performance (Lane & Meissner, 2008).
The Need for Theory
If the field is flourishing with the current applied perspective why do we need to
find a role for theory? The very phenomena that we study (i.e., eyewitness memory and
decision making) are applied issues, and the goal of our research will always be to
contribute our findings to the legal system. And although much of the success within the
field is the result of directly tackling individual problems (e.g., lineup bias), there are
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reasons why it would be a fruitful endeavor to develop more theoretically oriented
research programs to understand the identification process.
First, we will be better able to communicate our research findings to the legal
community if we can provide theoretically driven explanations (Turtle, Read, Lindsay, &
Brimacombe, 2008). That is, the substantial time and monetary cost of implementing
policy changes combined with the legal community’s depth of training in empirical
methodology at times makes it difficult to effectively persuade the legal community to
adopt certain policy changes. However, a strong theoretical framework that provides a
deeper understanding of witness choosing behavior will allow researchers to better
communicate the reasoning behind our policy recommendations, thereby, reducing the
skepticism of policy makers. This is of utmost importance, given the very reason why we
study eyewitness decision making is to help improve the legal system.
Second, one of the main criticisms of eyewitness memory research is that the
results are not valid unless they mirror real-world conditions (Lane & Meissner, 2008).
An excellent example of this argument was provided by Clark (2008) in his one-legged,
six-toed Scotsman example. An expert is testifying in a case and discusses the effect of
certain variables on eyewitness accuracy. The witness in the case is a one-legged, sixtoed Scotsman and the prosecution argues that the results of the research are not relevant
for this witness because no one-legged, six-toed Scotsman was a participant in the
research. Research literature will never be able to approximate every conceivable
combination of variables that will be present in real cases. However, theoretical
development will allow researchers to apply findings to non-studied circumstances
(Clark, 2008).
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Third, theoretically motivated research is much more likely to lead to greater
progress in our understanding of the phenomenological experiences witnesses engage in
while viewing a lineup compared to studying individual problems in a piecemeal fashion
(Lane & Meissner, 2008). Furthermore, greater understanding of the phenomenological
experiences will have greater impacts on practical advancements (Brewer, Weber, &
Semmler, 2007). That is, to truly develop innovative, practical advancements that will
lead to more diagnostic identifications we must first understand the phenomenological
experiences that differentiate accurate from inaccurate witnesses. In sum, although our
field has enjoyed much success thus far, theoretically motivated research is necessary to
significantly advance our understanding of the phenomena we study and to develop the
most impactful practical advances.
As noted by Brewer et al. (2007), an excellent illustration of how theoretically
driven research possesses much power in providing the most impactful practical advances
is the development of the sequential lineup procedure (Lindsay & Wells, 1985). Few
advancements within the eyewitness literature have enjoyed the level of impact that the
development of the sequential lineup procedure has had. The development of this novel
lineup procedure was driven by theoretical predictions regarding the nature of judgments
in which witnesses engage while making an identification. Wells (1984) proposed two
judgment strategies that eyewitnesses may engage in while viewing a lineup. That is, an
eyewitness may compare the lineup members to each other and then choose the lineup
member who looks most like the perpetrator (relative judgment). In comparison, an
eyewitness may compare each lineup member to their memory of the perpetrator and
choose the lineup member who best matches their memory of the perpetrator (absolute
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judgment). On the basis of the aforementioned judgment strategies, Lindsay and Wells
(1985) developed a novel lineup procedure, the sequential lineup, to reduce eyewitnesses’
ability to use relative judgments and thereby forcing them to use absolute judgments. The
procedure achieves this quite simply by having witnesses view photographs of lineup
members sequentially (one at a time) and making a decision (yes or no) before moving on
to a new photograph. The sequential lineup procedure contrasts the historically used
lineup procedure in which all photographs of lineup members are presented
simultaneously and eyewitnesses are allowed to look at all pictures before making an
identification decision. Importantly, Lindsay and Wells reasoned that if eyewitnesses
were forced to look at the photographs in a sequential fashion they would not be able to
engage in a relative judgment strategy. Since the Lindsay and Wells study, much research
has shown that sequential lineups, compared to simultaneous lineups, consistently
produce a greater reduction in false identifications from target-absent lineups compared
to the decreased rate of correct identifications from target-present lineups (for an
overview see Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001; for an alternative view, however,
see Carlson, Gronlund, & Clark, 2008; McQuiston-Surrett, Malpass, & Tredoux, 2006).
In sum, this example clearly illustrates theoretically motivated research is very effective,
not only in generating research that will ultimately lead to a greater understanding of the
phenomenological experiences witnesses engage in while viewing a lineup, but also in
generating those practical advances that will contribute most to the legal system.
Integrating Theory into the Field
At the most basic level eyewitness researchers are ultimately interested in
understanding why some witnesses make a lineup choice and others do not. Therefore, to
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integrate theory into the eyewitness field with any hope of success, theory must be able to
explain the choosing behavior of eyewitnesses (Brewer et al., 2007). Specifically, theory
must be able to account for two fundamental problems: 1) mistaken identifications of an
innocent suspect and 2) failing to identify the perpetrator when they are present in the
lineup. It is clear that the ultimate goal of eyewitness researchers is to 1) stop witnesses
from choosing when the perpetrator is not in the lineup and 2) ensure that witnesses
choose the perpetrator when he/she is in the lineup (Brewer et al., 2007). It seems there
exist two routes for researchers to develop/integrate theory into the field to help explain
the choosing behavior of eyewitnesses. One is to apply well developed theories from
other, related, areas of psychology (e.g., dual-process recognition theories) to examine
their ability to account for choosing behavior. Alternatively, a second route is to develop
theories within the field to examine their ability to account for choosing behavior.
Following will be a discussion of the theories researchers have used to explain witnesses’
choosing behavior.
Basic Cognitive Theories
The lineup task eyewitnesses complete is, quite simply, a recognition task.
Indeed, in a recognition task people are typically provided with choice options (in the
case of a lineup witnesses are given photographs) and are tasked with identifying an item
as being one they have been exposed to previously or not (in the case of a target-present
lineup, the perpetrator of the crime). Despite some differences between a lineup task and
a recognition task (e.g., many recognition tasks entail a single-item response task,
whereas lineups are a multiple-item response task), lineup tasks are essentially a test of
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one’s recognition memory. Thus, applying theories generated by recognition memory
researchers to a lineup situation seems appropriate.
To date there exist several memory models (known as dual process models) that
propose recognition memory judgments are the result of two distinct memory processes:
recollection and familiarity (for a review see Yonelinas, 2002). Though there are several
dual-process memory models, the core assumptions of these models are quite similar.
Recollection based judgments are typically thought to reflect an effortful, deliberative
process where retrieval of specific information about a study event occurs, whereas
familiarity based judgments are typically thought to reflect a non-effortful, automatic
process where a feeling of familiarity occurs (Atkinson, Hertmann, & Wescourt, 1974;
Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 1994). For instance, imagine you are walking on campus and
you see someone you recognize and you also remember where you recognize them from;
this would be indicative of a recollection based judgment. On the other hand, if you
recognize them but you cannot remember from where, this would be indicative of a
familiarity based judgment. There is also general agreement that familiarity is faster than
recollection (Atkinson, Hertmann, & Wescourt, 1974; Jacoby, 1991; Yonelinas, 1994)
and the two processes function independently at the time of retrieval (Jacoby, 1991;
Tulving, 1982; Yonelinas, 1994).
To evaluate the theoretical claims of these various dual-process models
researchers have developed several measurement techniques to assess these two
processes (e.g., process-dissociation procedure, receiver-operating-characteristic
procedures, the remember/know procedure). One of the commonly used techniques to
assess the contribution of the different types of memory (i.e., recollection, familiarity) to

6

the overall memory performance on a recognition task is the remember/know procedure
(RK; Tulving, 1985). In the remember/know technique participants are required to
introspect about the basis of their memory judgments and to indicate whether a given
item was “remembered” (R) or “known” (K). Specifically, if recognition was
accompanied by the recall of contextual details (e.g., the color of the stimulus), a (R)
response should be made, indicating a recollective experience; however, if recognition
was not accompanied by the recall of any contextual details, a (K) response should be
made, indicating a familiarity experience (Tulving, 1985). Importantly, the results
obtained using the RK procedure reveal similar patterns as those found using other
techniques to measure the contribution of the different types of memory (i.e.,
recollection, familiarity) to the overall memory performance, such as process-dissociation
and receiver-operating-characteristic procedures (Yonelinas, 2001; Yonelinas, Kroll,
Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 1998). That is, recognition memory judgments
accompanied by R judgments, although slower in nature, are more accurate and made
with greater confidence, than those accompanied by K judgments (Yonelinas, 2002).
Given the robustness of these findings and the parallel between a recognition task
and a lineup task, it seems plausible to expect a similar pattern of results to be revealed in
identification decisions. To date, several researchers have successfully used dual-process
models to account for witness choosing patterns (Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin,
2005; Palmer, Brewer, McKinnon, & Weber, 2010). For example, researchers have
demonstrated accurate identifications were more likely to be accompanied by R
judgments, which parallels the findings within the cognitive literature (Palmer et al.,
2010).
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Another approach used to account for eyewitness choosing behavior is Signal
Detection Theory (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966). According to SDT, people’s ability to
distinguish new from old stimuli is a function of two independent parameters calculated
mathematically. One of the parameters is called discriminability which is an individual’s
ability to correctly detect a signal (in a lineup this would be correctly identifying the
perpetrator) vs correctly rejecting its absence (in a lineup this would be correctly
rejecting a lineup that did not contain the perpetrator). Factors that affect the quality of
memory (e.g., encoding time, attention, encoding conditions, etc.) influence an
individual’s discriminability, with greater discriminability resulting from a higher quality
memory. The second parameter is called response criterion, which refers to the amount of
evidence needed for an individual to respond that a signal has been detected. Response
criterion is influenced by social and/or instructional factors that bias an individual to
respond either conservatively or liberally depending upon the social and/or instructional
factor presented. Given that a lineup task is essentially an old/new recognition task the
application of this theory to understanding eyewitness choosing behavior is appropriate
and as will be discussed below has been fruitful.
Historically, the standard lineup presentation procedure used in the legal system
consisted of showing a witness a set of photographs simultaneously that contained one
suspect, with the remaining photographs consisting of “known innocent” persons (a
simultaneous lineup). While debate still exists regarding the appropriateness of the
simultaneous lineup procedure (see Gronlund, Wixted, & Mickes, 2014; Wells, Smith, &
Smalarz, in press), many researchers would recommend the use of an alternative lineup
presentation procedure (i.e., a sequential lineup). The sequential lineup procedure,
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originally introduced by Lindsay and Wells (1985), consists of sequentially showing a
witness a set of photographs that contained one suspect, with the remaining photographs
consisting of “known innocent” persons1. Decades of research, including several metaanalyses (for example, Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001; Steblay, Dysart, &
Wells, 2011) contrasting these two lineup presentation procedures has revealed the
sequential lineup presentation yields a greater reduction in false identifications than in
correct identifications (with this pattern commonly referred to as the sequential
superiority effect). Furthermore, and arguably more importantly, the sequential lineup
procedure is more diagnostic of guilt compared to the simultaneous lineup procedure
(Steblay et al., 2011).
Generally, two explanations have been proposed to account for the dissociated
choosing patterns between simultaneous and sequential procedures. First, some
researchers have argued the increase in choosing rates found in simultaneous lineups is
the result of the type of judgment in which witnesses engage. Specifically, the
simultaneous procedure leads witnesses to engage in a strategy that leads to more
choosing (i.e., relative judgment strategy), while the sequential procedure, by nature,
removes this context thereby leading witnesses to use a strategy that leads to less
choosing (i.e., absolute judgment strategy; Lindsay & Wells, 1985). Second, others have
explained the dissociated choosing patterns within a recognition framework. Specifically,
the sequential procedure may result in an upward shift of a participants’ decision criterion
(i.e., the amount of evidence required to make an identification); in other words,
sequential lineup presentation may simply make witnesses less likely to choose overall
(Ebbesen & Flowe, 2002). To evaluate the criterion shift explanation researchers
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developed a novel lineup recognition paradigm which provided the necessary responses
needed to measure participants’ decision criterion; across three studies they found
support for the decision criterion shift explanation (Meissner et al., 2005). Specifically,
they found that participants shown a sequential lineup responded more conservatively
(i.e., they were less likely to choose) compared to those shown a simultaneous lineup.
Thus, SDT has provided a theoretical account of the dissociation of choosing patterns
found between simultaneous and sequential lineups. Thus far, we have focused solely on
the application of basic recognition models to account for eyewitness choosing behavior.
Next, a model that was designed specifically to account for eyewitness choosing behavior
will be discussed (i.e., the WITNESS model).
WITNESS Model of Eyewitness Choosing Behavior
Although many researchers initially attempted to account for witness choosing
behavior using dual-process recognition models, some have attempted to develop areaspecific models. Clark (2003) developed a mathematical model called WITNESS which
has successfully accounted for witness choosing behavior. As previously mentioned,
much research suggests witnesses engage in either a relative or absolute judgment
strategy (or some combination of both) to make an identification decision. With this
theoretical framework in mind, the model assumes witnesses make lineup decisions by
matching each lineup alternative to their memory of the culprit; the decision whether to
make an identification or not is then determined by a weighted combination of relative
and absolute match information. Specifically, match values associated with the lineup
members (roughly, their similarity to the witness’s memory of the criminal) are
calculated by a witness and then these match values are applied to a decision rule (i.e.,
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the witness’s decision criterion). For each lineup member the witness will match various
features of a lineup member (e.g., facial structure, hair and eye color, facial hair, height,
etc.) to their memory of those features possessed by the perpetrator and then weight the
importance of each feature in determining the level of match between the lineup member
and their memory of the perpetrator. For example, a witness using a decision rule based
on a 100% weighting of absolute judgment match information will identify the lineup
member who is the best match to the memory of the perpetrator if that lineup member’s
match value exceeds the witness’s decision criterion. Alternatively, a witness using a
decision rule based on a 100% weighting of relative judgment information will identify a
lineup member if the difference between the lineup member with the highest match value
and the lineup member with the next highest match value exceeds the witness’s decision
criterion. Importantly, the best match may be the result of either an absolute judgment
(e.g., the best match is identified because they are a very good match to memory) or a
relative judgment (e.g., the best match is identified because they are a much better match
than anyone else in the lineup) or some combination thereof. Although there is less
research evaluating the effectiveness of the WITNESS model in accounting for
eyewitness choosing behavior compared to the aforementioned dual-process recognition
models it nonetheless has been shown to reliably account for a variety of eyewitness
choosing patterns (Clare & Lewandowsky, 2004; Clark, 2003; Clark, Marshall, &
Rosenthal, 2009; Goodsell, Gronlund, & Scott, 2010).
Thus far I have discussed three theoretical approaches that have proven fruitful in
accounting for various patterns of eyewitness choosing behavior. As a result these
approaches have given researchers insights into the decision-making processes witnesses
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engage in while making a lineup decision. Although the aforementioned approaches
differ in some respects, they share an underlying theme from which their predictions of
eyewitness choosing behavior stem. Namely, a lineup task is predominately a memory
task, and thus, an eyewitnesses’ decision to choose or not choose a lineup member can be
accounted for by the amount of match (or lack thereof) a lineup member has to the
eyewitnesses’ memory of the perpetrator and that witness’s decision criterion. In other
words, these approaches, for the most part, would predict non-memorial based variables
would have little to no effect on choosing behavior, except insofar as they either (a) affect
the witness’s decision criterion, or (b) result in a re-assessment of the lineup members’
similarity to the perpetrator. However, I will argue a lineup task is not simply a memory
task, but is rather a memory task that occurs within a social context that allows nonmemorial variables to impact choosing behavior through an inferential process that
cannot be accounted for with a decision criterion shift or a re-assessment of the lineup
members’ similarity to the perpetrator. This is not to say that memory is not the driving
force underlying the phenomenological experience of the eyewitnesses’ decision making.
Rather, because of the nature of a lineup task, witnesses are inherently motivated to make
an identification, leading them to look for non-memorial cues in an attempt to determine
who the perpetrator is. Thus, it is important to develop and test theoretical approaches
that are able to take into account these non-memorial variables and their effect on
eyewitnesses’ decision making.
Motivation and Social Influence in a Lineup Task
The eyewitness and/or victim, the police, and the prosecutor are all motivated,
albeit to varying degrees, to obtain a positive identification of the suspect. An
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eyewitness’s and/or victim’s motivation to make a positive identification of the suspect
may stem from their wanting to feel good about their memory, that they are a good
member of society because they helped the police, and, in the victim eyewitness case they
can feel a sense of closure/justice. Furthermore, the police and prosecutors may be
motivated to selectively seek out information that confirms their pre-existing hypotheses
(i.g., confirmation bias; Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013) to prove they are competent
within their profession and/or to obtain justice for the victim.
This is not to say the motivation of the aforementioned parties is to simply get an
identification of a suspect, regardless of guilt. However, in a criminal investigation, if an
eyewitness is being shown a lineup it is because there is some suspicion on behalf of the
investigators that the suspect is the perpetrator. This makes sense from both the
witnesses’ and an investigator’s perspective. Witnesses may assume that if the police ask
them to look at a lineup it is implied the police have a suspect; why else would they be
asked to look at a lineup? Indeed, Memon, Gabbert, and Hope (2004) showed that over
90% of participants across several identification experiments reported they assumed the
perpetrator was in the lineup despite being provided with unbiased instructions. This
assumption should result in witnesses being motivated to make a lineup identification. In
sum, because of the specific nature of a lineup task the parties involved are all likely
motivated, to some extent, to obtain an identification of the suspect.
The argument that a lineup task is more than simply an amotivational memory
task, but rather is one that involves motivated witnesses, is not new (e.g., Wells & Luus,
1990). Recently, there have been calls for the development of new lineup procedures
(Brewer & Wells, 2011) and the development of theoretical frameworks that take into
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account the influence of social variables on choosing behavior (Brewer et al., 2007;
Charman & Wells, 2007a). The proposed studies are designed to test a theoretical
account of witness choosing behavior that incorporates a non-memorial based inferential
process into witnesses’ identification decisions.
Non-memorial influences in a lineup context
Multiple findings within the eyewitness area suggest that witnesses’ decisions are
partly based on motivational – as opposed to strictly memorial – factors. Wells and Luus
(1990) drew an analogy between a methodologically sound experiment and a lineup task.
That is, like participants in an experiment, eyewitnesses’ behavior during a lineup task
may be guided by experimenter bias and/or demand characteristics if preventative steps
are not taken (e.g., the use of a double-blind procedure). A large body of research shows
experimenters may communicate either directly or indirectly their expectations to
participants through their interaction with participants, termed Experimenter Expectancy
Effects, and as such participants will allow these expectations to influence their behavior
(Rosenthal, 1966).
Furthermore, when participants (or eyewitnesses) have preconceived ideas of the
desired outcome, this awareness may affect their behavior during the experiment (or
lineup task). These demand characteristics are likely to be present during a lineup task,
given eyewitnesses’ expectation that the perpetrator is in the lineup. Again, much
research has found evidence of the effect demand characteristics have on participant’s
behavior (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).
This analogy prompted Wells and Luus (1990) to propose a set of
recommendations for conducting a lineup. For instance, to reduce the effect of

14

experimenter bias, they suggested that lineups should be administered by someone who is
blind as to who the suspect in the lineup is (i.e., double-blind procedure). As expected,
findings within the eyewitness literature support the need for the use of a double-blind
procedure. Specifically, results across multiple studies indicate that witness are more
likely to choose from a lineup when the administrator had more contact with the
eyewitness (Haw & Fisher, 2004) or when the administrator was not blind (Greathouse &
Kovera, 2009; Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999; Rhead, Rodriguez,
Korobeynikov, Yip, & Kovera, 2015). Also, witnesses – especially those with weaker
memories – appear to look for indications from the lineup administrator as to the identity
of the suspect in the lineup when they are motivated to make an identification
(Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). These findings suggest that witnesses’ decisions are partly
being driven by non-memorial factors and importantly that the extent to which the nonmemorial factors affect choosing behavior is dependent upon witnesses’ ecphoric
experience (i.e., the perceived sense of similarity between a stimulus and a person’s
memory (Tulving, 1981).
Another example of social influence on eyewitness choosing behavior is that of
criminal face bias (Flowe & Humphries, 2011; McQuiston & Malpass, 2002), which is
the tendency of eyewitnesses to select the most criminal-looking person from a lineup.
Recently, Flowe and Humphries (2011) demonstrated this effect using a randomly
obtained sample of real police lineups. Results showed that participants who did not
receive a description of the suspect were biased toward choosing the most criminallooking faces. Furthermore, when asked to justify their lineup choices participants
indicated they chose the person because they looked like a criminal. Perhaps most
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interestingly, this bias had more of an effect on participants who had no other information
available to them. This finding provides some initial support that is directly relevant to
the current paper. First, as with administrator influence, it shows that eyewitnesses’
choosing behavior is affected by non-memorial cues. And, second, it provides a
foundation that the effect of these non-memorial cues may be moderated by the ecphoric
experience of the eyewitness.
Research investigating eyewitness confidence also provides evidence supporting
the idea that (1) social influences do impact witnesses’ decision making, and (2) these
influences are moderated by the ecphoric experience of the eyewitness. A reliable finding
within the literature is that confirming post-identification feedback from the administrator
(i.e., “Good you identified the suspect”) inflates witnesses’ retrospective confidence in
their identification decision (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; see meta-analysis by Steblay,
Wells, & Douglass, 2014). Furthermore, research has shown that the confirming feedback
effect is stronger for witnesses who are inaccurate (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002;
Charman & Wells, 2012). Thus, these findings support the idea that witnesses do use
non-memorial cues to guide them in their decision-making, and importantly, the effect of
these non-memorial cues is greater when witnesses have a weak ecphoric experience
compared to a strong ecphoric experience.
Thus far, I have established several important points. First, there exists a strong
motivational component in a lineup task. Second, this motivation and the presence of
social influence leads eyewitnesses to not simply rely on the memorial processes alone
while making an identification decision but also non-memorial cues that are present in
the lineup. Third, the effect of these non-memorial cues on choosing behavior may be
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moderated by the ecphoric experience of the eyewitness. An important question remains:
Can the existing theoretical frameworks account for these data?
Again, the three theoretical frameworks (dual-recognition models, SDT, and the
WITNESS model) that have been used to account for choosing behavior thus far are
based on the idea that a lineup task is predominately a memory task; these approaches
postulate that the effect of witnesses’ motivation and/or non-memorial cues on choosing
behavior would be changing their decision criterion (i.e., the amount of memorial match
needed to make an identification). According to the criterion shift explanation the
presence of a non-memorial cue should result in a specific pattern of data, that is, it
should lower a witness’s decision criterion thereby increasing choosing rates independent
of the witness’s ecphoric experience.
However, Clark et al. (2009) showed a different pattern of data inconsistent with a
criterion shift explanation. They were investigating the effect of administrator influence
on eyewitness identification decisions. The two influence conditions consisted of either
providing cautionary statements (e.g., “take your time”; subtle-influence condition) or
asked the witness directly to consider the most-similar lineup member (similarityinfluence condition). Interestingly, they found that witnesses in the subtle-influence
condition were more likely to choose, but only for witnesses who viewed target-absent
lineups, resulting in increased false identifications but not increased correct
identifications. And most important to the current point, the subtle influence
manipulation changed the distribution of choices in the target-absent condition. This
latter pattern of data cannot be accounted for by the criterion shift explanation. For
example, imagine a lineup in which lineup member 5 is the best memorial match.
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Decreasing a witness’s decision criterion should certainly result in a higher identification
rate; however, the overall distribution of choices would be the same. That is, because
lineup member 5 is the best memorial match he would be picked at a higher rate
compared to the other lineup members regardless of the witness’s decision criterion. The
effects of a manipulation that changes not only the overall choosing rate, but also the
distribution of choices, cannot be explained via a simple change in decision criterion. As
stated by Clark et al. (2009), changing the decision criterion can determine whether the
best memorial match will be selected, but it cannot determine who the best match is.
Other data are also inconsistent with the criterion shift explanation. A criterion
shift explanation predicts that a lowering of witnesses’ decision criteria will result in
increased choosing in both target-present and target-absent lineups; however, numerous
findings have failed to produce this pattern of results. For instance, although most studies
investigating the effect of biased/unbiased instructions show increases in both correct and
false identification rates, some have only shown an increase in false identifications (e.g.,
Cutler & Penrod, 1988; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Malpass & Devine, 1981).
Also, a similar pattern has been shown when eyewitnesses are given instructions
regarding the possible appearance change of the suspect (Charman & Wells, 2007b).
Clearly, there exists data that the criterion shift explanation has a difficult time
accounting for, but what about the WITNESS model? To account for his data that subtleinfluence changed the distribution of choices, Clark et al. (2009) proposed that instead of
the match values being an unchanging static variable witnesses will update the match
values when a non-memorial cue is present. The reassessment of match values
explanation predicts the presence of a non-memorial cue may lead witnesses to re-weight
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the importance of certain features which would either lower (or raise) lineup members’
match values, and importantly, change which lineup member is now the best match. To
date, this modification to the WITNESS model has not been empirically tested.
A Novel Model of Eyewitness Choosing Behavior
Charman and Wells (2007a) proposed a model developed specifically to account
for eyewitness choosing behavior. Their model, the Competition/Corroboration
Conceptualization (CCC), is based in part from Logan’s (1988) instance theory. In brief,
instance theory attempts to account for the development of automatic processes of any
given stimulus. According to the theory, when first presented with a stimulus one begins
by slowly responding in a deliberative algorithmic way to the stimulus, but with
increased exposure to the stimulus one accumulates memories, or instances, of interacting
with the stimulus. As such, at a certain point one stops responding to the stimulus using
slow, deliberative algorithmic responses and instead responds to the stimulus based off of
an accumulation of instances regarding responses to the stimulus. Importantly, deliberate
and automatic processes do not operate in isolation but rather operate in parallel fashion,
with the two processes racing and the one that finishes the race first controlling the
outcome. Accordingly, as instances of the stimulus accumulate over time the response is
more likely to be driven by memory-based processes than by the algorithmic-based
processes. Of note, for the purpose of CCC, algorithmic- and memory-based responses
are analogous to inferential and ecphoric processes, respectively.
On the basis of this framework, the CCC states that witnesses will have an
ecphoric experience (i.e., recognition) and will also engage in inferential (i.e., reasoning)
processes when looking at a lineup, and that there exists a trade-off between the two. For
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example, imagine a situation in which you were sitting next to a man at the bus stop for
30 minutes and then gets up and robs a young woman who was approaching the bus stop.
If the police showed you a lineup containing a picture of this individual taken soon after
the crime and five fillers you would likely immediately recognize the perpetrator and
correctly identify him. Because your memory was strong and a recent picture was
included in the lineup you were likely to have had a strong ecphoric experience and
therefore would not have to try and reason (i.e., engage in inferential processing) which
lineup member was the thief. However, imagine the same situation except the police put
an innocent man in the lineup. Now when you look at the lineup you have a weak
ecphoric experience but because you are motivated to make an identification you begin
using non-memorial cues present in the lineup (e.g., only one member is wearing the
same color jacket the thief was wearing) to infer which lineup member is the perpetrator.
To the extent that witnesses have a strong ecphoric experience, they will engage
in fewer inferential processes; to the extent that witnesses have a weak ecphoric
experience, they will engage in more inferential processes. Choosing and identification
confidence are both partly a function of whether the two processes – ecphoric experience
and inferential – cooperate (i.e., lead to the same lineup member) or compete (i.e., lead
to different lineup members) with each other. Thus, two main points arise from this
conceptualization: Non-memorial cues can influence choosing (as they can lead witnesses
to infer who the suspect is in a lineup), and the magnitude of the influence of those nonmemorial cues is inversely proportional to the strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric
experience.
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The tradeoff between the witnesses’ ecphoric experience (i.e., recognition) and
inferential (i.e., reasoning) processing proposed by the CCC reflects a framework that
several social and cognitive psychological theories propose. For instance, the outshining
hypothesis (Smith, 1988) predicts that the effectiveness of environmental context cues
will be dependent upon the presence (or absence) of better cues. In other words, when a
person’s memory is weak they will use external cues to aid in their task. However, when
a person’s memory is strong they will not seek external cues to aid in their task. Indeed,
research shows that context reinstatement leads to better memory when a free recall task
is given (a situation where the memorial task is more difficult because of the absence of
cues), but does not affect memory performance when a recognition task is given (a
situation where the memorial task is easier because of the presence of cues; e.g., Godden
& Baddeley, 1975, 1980; Smith, Glenberg, & Bjork, 1978). Another example of this
general framework is Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory which proposes that
individuals will not seek out external comparisons to aid in their self-evaluations if their
own internal standards are strong. Thus, in general the extent to which external influences
impact peoples memory, self-perceptions, and/or other behavioral phenomenon seem to
be inversely related to the strength of the available internal influences.
Although the CCC and Instance Theory share much of the same underlying
framework, the CCC differs in some respects due mainly with its application to a lineup
task. Whereas Instance Theory states automaticity is reached through the accruing of
repeated interaction with a stimulus, the CCC states an ecphoric experience may develop
through any processes that increases memory quality (e.g., increased exposure duration,
quality of view, degree of attention allocated, etc.). Next, the strength of the ecphoric
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experience is dependent upon the quality of the witnesses’ memory and the extent to
which the witnesses’ memorial representation of the perpetrator closely matches the
perpetrator’s physical appearance in the lineup. In other words, strength of the ecphoric
experience is dependent upon the level of ecphoric similarity between the witnesses’
memory and the perpetrator’s appearance in the lineup. As this match weakens, either
because of a poor memory or because the perpetrator is not in the lineup, so will the
ecphoric experience. Lastly, according to the CCC, if the witness has a strong ecphoric
experience it will always win; however, inferential processes still occur before any
decision is made. To clarify, within this framework, an inferential process is when a
witness tries to ascertain who the suspect is. Thus, the CCC proposes that regardless of
the strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience, witnesses’ will usually engage in
inferential processes which will either support (corroborate) or cast doubt (compete)
about the veracity of the ecphoric response. Next I will discuss evidence within the
literature that shows witnesses choosing behavior is driven by both the ecphoric
experience and inferential processing.
Research investigating various postdictors of eyewitness accuracy (i.e., variables
collected during or after the identification itself that are related to a witness’s accuracy)
suggest that quick, automatic responses are related to correct identifications whereas
slow, deliberative responses are related to false identifications (Leippe & Eisenstadt,
2007). Four specific postdictors have been discovered. First, accurate identifications tend
to be associated with higher confidence (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). Second,
decision time has been consistently shown to be negatively associated with accuracy
(Smith, Lindsay, & Pryke, 2000; Sporer, 1992, 1994), such that witnesses who take a
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long time to make an identification (presumably because they are using inferential
processing) tend to be less accurate than those who come to a quick decision (presumably
because they have a strong ecphoric experience). Third, witnesses who report having had
an automatic recognition experience (i.e., strong ecphoric experience) during the lineup
identification task are more likely to make accurate identifications than witnesses who
report having engaged in more deliberative, process-of-elimination judgments (i.e.,
inferential processing; Dunning & Stern, 1994; Dunning & Perretta, 2002; Smith et al.,
2000). Lastly, accurate witnesses (i.e., those who tended to have had a strong ecphoric
experience) tend to remember fewer fillers than inaccurate witnesses, presumably
because they were less likely to encode the fillers’ faces (Charman & Cahill, 2012).
These findings likely all stem from a common underlying process: when a witness has a
strong ecphoric experience it indicates they have likely seen that person before, thus
suggesting the lineup member is the perpetrator. On the other hand, a weak ecphoric
experience leads a witness to engage in inferential processing, and is thus likely to result
in an inaccurate identification. Note that this is consistent with the CCC’s prediction of a
trade-off between ecphoric experience and inferential processes: Witnesses with a weak
ecphoric experience engage in subsequent inferential processes, which can lead to false
identifications.
Based upon the above data it seems clear eyewitnesses (1) engage in inferential
processing and (2) the extent to which witnesses engage in inferential processing is
dependent upon the strength of their ecphoric experience. Furthermore, this line of
research also provides support that eyewitnesses are motivated to make a decision and if
that decision does not come easy (i.e., strong ecphoric experience) they will engage in
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inferential processing in search of evidence (both memorial and non-memorial) for which
lineup member they should identify.
The CCC is quite capable of explaining much of the existing data, including the
findings suggesting a trade-off between the ecphoric experience and inferential
processing: the fact that non-memorial cues affect choosing behavior (e.g., administrator
influence; Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Phillips et al., 1999), that the effect of nonmemorial cues is greater when they have no other information to rely on (e.g., criminalface bias; Flowe & Humphries, 2011), and data showing that certain cues can change the
distribution of choices (e.g., administrator influence; Clark et al., 2009). In sum, by
postulating that witnesses may engage in inferential processes, the CCC can account for
the motivational component of a lineup task.
Thus far I have presented three theoretical explanations that may possibly account
for the effect of non-memorial cues on witness choosing behavior. Each explanation
makes a different prediction about how a non-memorial cue will affect witness choosing
behavior. First, a criterion shift explanation would predict that the presence of a nonmemorial cue will lower witnesses’ decision criterion resulting in increased choosing
regardless of witnesses’ ecphoric experience. Second, the reassessment of match values
explanation would predict that any effect of the presence of a non-memorial cue on
witness choosing will be mediated by a change in perceived similarity. Third, the
inferential based framework will predict that the presence of a non-memorial cue will
affect choosing rates independently of a change in perceived similarity.
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Present Study
The purpose of the present study was to provide an initial test of the inferential
based framework proposed by the CCC. First, in Study 1, I examined whether mock
witnesses – who lack a memory of a perpetrator – nonetheless use non-memorial based
cues to infer the identity of the suspect in a lineup; this will also allow me to determine
the most effective non-memorial cue to use in Study 2. Second, in Study 2, the primary
goal was to examine the backbone of the CCC, by examining whether the effect of nonmemorial cues (which require inferential processing) is moderated by the strength of the
witnesses’ ecphoric experience. An additional goal was to test the three theoretical
explanations (i.e., criterion shift, reassessment of match values, and inferential based
explanation) that attempt to account for the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing
behavior. Specific hypotheses and the rationale supporting each prediction will be further
outlined for each Study.
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II. STUDY 1
Given the importance of this manipulation and the relative scarcity of past
research examining this specific manipulation, the goal of Study 1 was to test whether
non-memorial cues affect mock witnesses’ choosing behavior. To provide a test of the
CCC it was necessary to use non-memorial cues that would affect choosing rates without
affecting the memorial experience of the witness. For example, having only one of the
lineup members wearing similar clothing to that of the perpetrator could be used as a cue
to affect witnesses’ choosing behavior. However, in this case the memory-based models
could account for this effect via an increase in familiarity: Perhaps the similarity of
clothing worn by the suspect produces a sense of familiarity in the witness, thus allowing
memory-based theories to account for these data. Thus, the cues used in Study 1 were
deliberately chosen because they are assumed to affect choosing yet are unlikely to do so
by increasing familiarity.
Because the CCC predicts these cues will be most effective when the witnesses’
ecphoric experience is weak compared to when it is strong, Study 1 used a mock-witness
paradigm. Doob and Kirshenbaum (1973) proposed the mock-witness paradigm to
evaluate the extent to which the suspect in the lineup stands out compared to the other
lineup members (i.e., lineup bias). In contrast to a real witness, a mock-witness has no
memory of the perpetrator but is still asked to view a lineup and to identify the person
who they think is the suspect. To aid the mock-witnesses’ decision, they are given a
verbal description provided by the actual witness. If the lineup is fair then the mockwitnesses’ identifications should be evenly distributed amongst the lineup members,
whereas if a lineup is biased against the suspect the suspect will be identified at a rate
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above chance. I hypothesized that the presence of a cue on a lineup member will lead to
increased choosing of that lineup member compared to the absence of a cue. Because the
mock witnesses by definition lack a memory of the perpetrator, such a finding could only
be accounted for if mock witnesses used the cue infer who the suspect is.
Method
Participants and Design. One hundred forty-six undergraduate students (68%
female; 65% Hispanic; Mage = 22, SD = 3) from a large southeastern university
participated in exchange for extra credit in their psychology courses. This research was
fully approved to meet all ethical standards of treatment by an institutional review board
(IRB). One group of participants (n = 73) were shown 8 lineups, five of which had a nonmemorial cue on a randomly selected lineup member, while 3 lineups were distractors
with no non-memorial cue present. A separate group of participants (n = 73) were shown
the same 5 cued lineups except there were no non-memorial cues present.
Materials
Non-memorial cue stimuli. For this study I developed 5 non-memorial cues to
assess. In essence the goal of a non-memorial cue in the lineup is to provide the witness
with a cue that they could use to help guide their choosing behavior without affecting
familiarity. The cues that were tested were: 1) One of the photographs had a different
color background compared to the other photographs in the lineup which all had white
backgrounds, 2) One of the photographs had a mug shot like background whereas the
other photographs in the lineup had no backgrounds, 3) One of the photographs had a
circle around its number whereas the other photographs in the lineup did not, 4) One of
the photographs was slightly larger in size compared to the other photographs in the
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lineup, and 5) One of the photographs was tilted at an angle whereas the other lineup
photographs were not.
Lineup construction. All lineups were constructed using a digital database of
student identification photographs. Of the five critical lineups (those both groups were
exposed to either containing the cue or not), two consisted of Hispanic Females, one of
Hispanic Males, one of Caucasian Females, and one of Caucasian Males. Of the three
distractor lineups (that were only shown to half of the participants), one consisted of
Hispanic Females, one of Hispanic Males, and one of African American Females. For
each lineup a mock suspect was first selected then fillers were chosen based on the
similarity to that mock suspect. Lineups were shown simultaneously on a computer
screen in full color in a 3 x 2 array consisting of head-and-shoulder views, wearing
everyday clothing in a full-frontal view.
Procedure
Lineups were shown to two separate psychology classes at the beginning of the
class. Participants were instructed that they would view a series of lineups and that for
each lineup they were to choose the lineup member who best fit the description provided
to them. Of note, none of the non-memorial cues manipulated affected or were related to
this description. At the top of each lineup a vague description was provided consisting of
ethnicity, gender, and hair and eye color. All participants’ responses were recorded
before moving to the next lineup and they were kept blind as to the number of lineups
they would view. For the group that saw the lineups with the non-memorial cues
embedded in five of them, there was an additional three lineups (distractor lineups) with
no additional cues embedded to prevent the participants from deducing the purpose of the
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study. Only those in the non-memorial cue condition were shown these distractor lineups.
Once all data was recorded the participants were thanked for their time and given extra
credit.
Results and Discussion
To examine the effect of the non-memorial cues on choosing I compared the rate
at which the cued lineup member was chosen when the cue was present (cue condition)
compared to when it was absent (control condition). Only two cues significantly
increased choosing rates of the cued member. First, when the lineup member’s number
was circled he was chosen at a significantly higher rate (56.2%) compared to when the
cue was absent (34.2%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 7.08, p = .008, φ2 = .05. Second, when the
lineup member had a mugshot like background she was chosen at a significantly higher
rate (37.0%) compared to when the cue was absent (13.7%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 10.46, p =
.001, φ2 = .07.
The remaining three cues did not affect choosing rates. First, when the lineup
member’s photograph had a different colored background he was chosen at a similar rate
(63.0%) compared to when his background was not different (43.9%), χ2(1, N = 146) =
2.78, p = .09, φ2 = .02. Second, when the lineup member’s photograph was enlarged she
was chosen at a similar rate (9.6%) compared to when her photograph was the same size
as the other members (16.4%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 1.51, p = .22, φ2 = .01. Third, when the
lineup member’s photograph was tilted he was chosen at a similar rate (13.7%) compared
to when his photograph was not tilted (9.6%), χ2(1, N = 146) = 0.59, p = .44, φ2 = .004.
Based upon these results it was established that both the presence of a circle on a
lineup member’s number and a mugshot-like background significantly increased
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choosing rates of those lineup members compared to the absence of the cue. Thus, I
showed that mock witnesses use non-memorial cues to infer the identity of the suspect in
a lineup. However, it should be noted that this study does not provide any evidence as to
the predictions made by the CCC because this study used mock-witnesses who by
definition have no memory of the crime and who are forced to choose. On one hand, it is
not all that surprising that under these contrived conditions they used the presence of a
cue to aid in their lineup choice. On the other hand, the fact that not every cue we tested
affected choosing rates indicates that not all cues have comparable effects. It may be that
the cues that did not affect choosing (i.e., different color, enlarged, and tilted) did not
allow the mock witnesses to infer who the suspect was. In contrast, the circle and
mugshot-like background may have allowed the mock witnesses to infer the identity of
the suspect. For example, the mock witnesses might have inferred the circle in the lineup
implied that another witness already identified this person, thus implying that lineup
member was the suspect. Importantly, because mock-witnesses have no memory of the
perpetrator any effect of the cue on choosing rates must have been the result of an
inferential process. However, these results cannot tell us how these cues will affect real
witnesses who have an actual memory of the perpetrator. Thus, the purpose of Study 2
was to examine the effect of non-memorial cues on real witnesses.
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III. STUDY 2
As previously stated, the purpose of this study was to examine whether the effect
of non-memorial cues (which require inferential processing) on witness choosing
behavior is moderated by the strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience. The strength
of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience depends upon the convergence of two factors. First,
it depends on the strength of the initial memory of the stimulus (i.e., the perpetrator).
Second, it depends on the similarity between the stimulus presented during the
recognition experience (e.g., the suspect’s photograph in the lineup) and the stimulus as
presented during the memorial event (in this case the perpetrator’s face). Thus, although
ecphoric experience can be manipulated in various ways, the simplest manipulation
involves presenting witnesses with either a target-present (strong ecphoric experience) or
a target-absent (weak ecphoric experience) lineup (e.g., see Charman & Wells, 2012).
This manipulation is effective because it alters the level of similarity between the
witness’s memory of the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s appearance by either including
(strong ecphoric experience) or not including (weak ecphoric experience) the perpetrator
in the lineup. According to the CCC, non-memorial cues will have a greater effect on
eyewitness choosing behavior among witnesses who have a weak ecphoric experience
(i.e., from target-absent lineups) rather than a strong ecphoric experience (i.e., from
target-present lineups). Therefore, I hypothesized that the presence of a non-memorial
cue will increase choosing rates of the cued member, and will do so more when witnesses
have a weak ecphoric experience than a strong ecphoric experience (Hypothesis 1).
Recall that the CCC predicts that the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing
behavior will occur via leading witnesses to deliberatively infer who the suspect is
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whereas the WITNESS model predicts that non-memorial cues will lead a witness to reassess the match values of the various lineup members, thus potentially changing who
appears most similar to the witness’s memory of the perpetrator. To tease apart these two
explanations I collected similarity data of the various lineup members. It was predicted,
consistent with CCC predictions, that the perceived similarity between the suspect’s
lineup photograph and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator would not mediate the
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications (Hypothesis 2).
Additionally, according to the CCC, regardless of the strength of their ecphoric
experience witnesses will engage in some level of inferential processing because the
importance of the decision and the lack of time constraints allows witnesses motivation
and time to engage in these processes. Thus, I predicted that corroborating cues (i.e.,
when a deliberative cue suggests the identified lineup member) should increase
confidence whereas competing cues (i.e., when a deliberative cue suggests someone other
than the identified lineup member) should reduce confidence, and this effect will be
greater among witnesses who have a weak ecphoric experience rather than witnesses who
have a strong ecphoric condition (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, if inferential processing is
engaged in regardless of the strength of the ecphoric experience, then even when
witnesses have a strong ecphoric experience, decision time should be longer for those in
the cued conditions compared to the no-cue condition (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants and Design. Three hundred seventy six undergraduate students
(64.1% female; 62.7% Hispanic; Mage = 21, SD = 3.33) from a large southeastern
university participated in exchange for extra credit in their psychology courses. This
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research was fully approved to meet all ethical standards of treatment by an IRB.
Participants were assigned randomly to conditions in a 2 (lineup type: target-present,
target-absent) x 3 (non-memorial cue: cue-target, cue-filler, no-cue) between-subjects
design. Lineup type refers to the presence (target-present) or absence (target-absent) of
the perpetrator. We chose to use the circle as the non-memorial cue in the present study
because, unlike the mug-shot like background cue, the circle cue does not alter the actual
photographs in the lineup. Thus, any effect the circle had on choosing behavior would be
difficult to account for with an increase in familiarity explanation. Non-memorial cue
refers to the placement of the cue (or lack thereof) within the lineup. In the cue-target
condition, participants viewed a lineup in which a co-witness had ostensibly identified
the perpetrator’s photograph (target-present lineups) or the innocent suspect’s photograph
(target-absent lineups) by circling that lineup member’s number. In the cue-filler
condition, participants viewed a lineup in which a co-witness had ostensibly identified
one of the fillers in the lineup by circling that lineup member’s number (the cue will be
rotated amongst the two best alternative fillers). Lastly, in the no-cue condition,
participants viewed a lineup without a non-memorial cue present.
Materials
Mock crime video. The mock-crime video portrayed a young Hispanic male
stealing money from a purse on a table outside of a University building. The video was
53s in length with the perpetrator’s face in view for 13s. All witnesses viewed the same
video together on a computer screen.
Lineup construction. Fillers were chosen from a digital database of student
identification photographs. Fillers were chosen based on their match to the perpetrator on
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various characteristics (gender, age, skin tone, hair color and length, and facial hair). Six
fillers were chosen based on the aforementioned characteristics. Target-absent lineups
were composed of these six fillers whereas target-present lineups were constructed by
replacing filler #2 with the target. Thus, filler #2 served as our a priori innocent suspect in
target-absent lineups. Research using this identical lineup indicated that the target-present
lineup had an effective size of 4.0 (Charman & Cahill, 2012).
The non-memorial cue manipulation consisted of providing the participants in the
cued conditions with ostensible co-witness information in the form of a circle on one of
the lineup member’s number, thus allowing a witness to infer that another witness had
identified the cued member as the thief from the video. Several deceptive steps, described
in detail below in the procedure section, were taken to ensure the participants believed
that the circle was made by a fellow witness and not the researcher. There were four
lineup variations for each lineup type (i.e., present, absent): one lineup with an “erased”
circle on the target (or innocent suspect) photo’s number (cue-target condition), two
lineups with the “erased” circle rotated between the two best alternative fillers’ numbers
(cue-filler condition), and one lineup with no cue present (no-cue condition).
Furthermore, the position of the target (or innocent suspect) was rotated between position
two and five. Thus, in total there were 16 lineup variations. Lineup members were shown
simultaneously on a sheet of paper in full color in a 3 x 2 array consisting of head-andshoulder views, wearing everyday clothing in a full-frontal view.
Procedure
Upon arrival participants in groups of 2 or 3 (with 70.2% of participants being in
groups of 3), viewed a short video on a computer monitor. Upon completion of the video
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participants were told the man in the video was stealing money from a purse and they
were now witnesses to the crime. Furthermore, they were told the purpose of the
experiment was to examine the consistency of co-witnesses’ memory by having them
answer the same questions about the crime they just witnessed.
Next, they were told they would all be shown the same lineup and asked to
identify the thief from the video. During these instructions the researcher showed the
participants the back of the purportedly only lineup which had a solid green paper taped
to the back. In reality all lineups had this same solid green paper taped to the back. This
was done to further support the deception that all witnesses would be viewing the same
lineup. They were then told they would work on an anagram task separately for several
minutes until the researcher was ready to test them. But before separating them they were
instructed to draw a number from a hat which would indicate the order in which they
would make their lineup decisions; in reality all the numbers were a “3”, thus making
them believe they would be the last witness to view the lineup. To ensure the deception
they were told not to reveal their number to each other.
Once separated the researcher entered each room and asked them which number
they drew. After the participants worked on the anagram task for 5-min, the researcher
assigned participants randomly to one of the conditions and then chose randomly the
order the participants were tested. Upon entering the room, the researcher thanked them
for their patience while they tested the other participants first; again this was to reinforce
the deception. The researcher was holding up a clipboard with the lineup on the bottom
such that the back of the lineup, with the solid green paper on the back, was in clear view
of the participant while they provided lineup instructions. The researcher provided the
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instructions for the lineup task including unbiased lineup instructions (e.g., the
perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup and a “not there” response is acceptable;
Malpass & Devine, 1981). Furthermore, to ensure that participants were sufficiently
motivated to take the lineup task seriously they were told that if they made the correct
lineup decision they would receive an extra point of course credit. (In reality, regardless
of the accuracy of their decision they received the extra point of credit.) Before the
researcher showed the participant the lineup they glanced at the lineup and ostensibly
noticed something wrong with the lineup. They apologized to the participant and picked
up an eraser from the desk and proceeded to erase something on the lineup. Importantly,
the participant did not see what the researcher was erasing and in fact the researcher
actually was not erasing anything. Again, this was done to reinforce the deception that the
circle in the lineup was from a fellow co-witness and not the researcher. Lastly, the
participant was shown one of the aforementioned lineups and their identification and
decision time (measured using a digital stopwatch) was assessed. Immediately following
their identification participants provided a confidence judgment. Specifically, they were
asked, On a scale from 0 (Not Confident at all) to 100 (Completely Confident) how
confident are you in your lineup decision?
Next, participants completed a memory questionnaire that assessed the remaining
dependent measures. The order of the questionnaire was as follows. First, participants
viewed the lineup presented to them previously and, for each lineup member, indicated
how “physically similar” the lineup member was to their memory of the thief from the
video on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (Not at all similar) to 10 (Very Similar).
Next, participants completed a series of open-ended questions assessing the processes
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underlying their lineup identification decisions, their perceived impact of the nonmemorial cues on their decision making, and their motivations underlying their
identification decision (e.g., Please describe why you made your lineup decision. That is,
why did you choose X lineup member or why did you choose the “not there option”). See
Appendix for a complete list of questions.
Next, participants completed questions assessing the automaticity/deliberativeness
of their identification experience, as well as whether they engaged in absolute or relative
judgment strategies, via their endorsement of various statements that described processes
in which they may have engaged. Participants were allowed to endorse having used as
few or as many of these processes as they wished to describe how they reached an
identification decision. Participants then completed questions assessing their self-reported
viewing conditions (e.g., “How clear is the image you have in your memory of the target
photo? “). See Appendix for a complete list of questions. Lastly, participants completed a
demographic questionnaire (e.g., age, gender, etc.).
Results
Manipulation Check. Prior to examining the main hypotheses we first needed to
examine the effectiveness of the ecphoric experience manipulation. Several lines of
evidence, detailed below, were used to independently examine the effectiveness of the
ecphoric experience manipulation.
Similarity ratings. The extent to which a witness had a strong ecphoric
experience depends upon the quality of memory and the level of similarity between the
witness’s memory of the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s lineup photograph. Thus,
manipulating lineup type (target-present vs target-absent) should have led to changes in
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the level of ecphoric similarity reported by witnesses. To more precisely assess the effect
of lineup type on ecphoric similarity only witnesses in the control group (i.e., those who
did not receive a non-memorial cue) were included in this analysis. In support, witnesses
in the target-present condition rated the suspect’s photograph as significantly more
similar (M = 7.24, SD = 2.52) compared to witnesses in the target-absent condition (M =
3.34, SD = 2.57), t(122) = 8.51, p < .001, η2 = .37.
Postdictor variables. Research consistently shows that witnesses who make
accurate identifications tend to make quicker decisions, report having had an automatic
recognition experience, and have a higher level of confidence-all indicative of a strong
automatic experience (Charman & Cahill, 2012; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Shaw, 1996).
Given the assumption that the postdictors are effective because they reflect the strength
of the ecphoric experience a witness had, differences in these postdictors across lineup
type would be indicative of a successful manipulation of ecphoric experience. Of note,
only witnesses that made an identification were included in these analyses because
postdictors have only been found to postdict accuracy in choosers. First, witnesses in the
target-present condition had a marginally significantly higher level of confidence (M =
70.79, SD = 18.66) compared to witnesses in the target-absent condition (M = 66.58, SD
= 20.75), t(271) = 1.75, p = .08, η2 = .01. Second, witnesses in the target-present
condition took significantly less time to make a decision (Ms = 19.22, SD = 13.95)
compared to witnesses in the target-absent condition (Ms = 25.14, SD = 17.79), t(271) = -3.08, p = .002, η2 = .03. Third, witnesses in the target-present condition reported a higher
level of automaticity (M = 0.65, SD = 0.74) compared to witnesses in the target-absent
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condition (M = 0.42, SD = 0.65), t(271) = 2.67, p = .008, η2 = .03. As expected, the
aforementioned analyses indicated the manipulation of automaticity was successful.
Choosing Behavior
One of the main predictions of the CCC was that the presence of a non-memorial
cue would increase choosing rates of the cued member, and would do so more when
witnesses have a weak ecphoric experience (Hypothesis 1). Because the hypothesis
specifically predicts that the presence of a non-memorial cue will lead to an increase in
choosing rates of the cued lineup member, separate analyses were conducted for suspect
identifications and filler identifications. Thus, multiple binary hierarchical-logistic
regression analyses were conducted examining the effect of the non-memorial cue and
lineup type on the various identification choices (i.e., suspect and filler identifications).
Suspect identifications. To examine the effect of the non-memorial cue for those
in the cue-target condition I regressed the likelihood of making a suspect identification
(i.e., chose the target from the target-present lineup or chose the innocent suspect from
the target-absent lineup) on non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue) and lineup type
(target-present, target-absent).
Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on suspect identifications
was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.11, p = .74, OR = 0.92. However, witnesses were more
likely to identify the suspect in the target-present condition (65.6%) compared to the
target-absent condition (17.2%), Wald(1) = 52.16, p < .001, OR = 9.22. More
importantly, results indicated the inclusion of the interaction term significantly improved
model fit, χ2(1, N = 244) = 12.54, p < .001. The model correctly classified 74.2% of
witnesses’ into suspect identifiers (or not) and accounted for a large amount of variance
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(Nagelkerke R = .35). Individually, the model indicated the interaction term accounted
for a unique amount of variance, Wald(1) = 10.90, p = .001, OR = 10.31. For those in the
target-absent condition, simple main effects indicated witnesses were significantly more
likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (26.6%) compared to the no-cue
condition (6.9%), Wald(1) = 7.21, p = .007, OR = 4.88. In contrast, for witnesses in the
target-present condition, simple main effects indicated witnesses were significantly less
likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (56.4%) compared to the no-cue
condition (73.1%), Wald(1) = 3.71, p = .05, OR = 0.47. See Table 1 for probability and
odds of suspect identification by condition.
Clearly, the presence of a non-memorial cue affected choosing behavior and was
moderated by the ecphoric experience. Consistent with predictions the presence of a nonmemorial cue increased suspect identifications in target-absent lineups. However,
unexpectedly the presence of a cue decreased suspect identifications in target-present
lineups. I will return to this point later. An important question is how is the non-memorial
cue affecting suspect identifications among witnesses? There are two possible
explanations.
Redistribution of identifications. The first explanation is that the non-memorial
cue led witnesses who would have made a filler identification to identify the suspect. In
other words, the non-memorial cue redistributed the identifications of witnesses who
were already inclined to choose. To examine this explanation I regressed the likelihood of
making a suspect identification (i.e., chose the target from the target-present lineup or
chose the innocent suspect from the target-absent lineup) on non-memorial cue (cue-
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target, no-cue) and lineup type (target-present, target-absent), but only included witnesses
who made a lineup identification (i.e., choosers only).
Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on suspect identifications
was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.11, p = .74, OR = 0.91. However, witnesses were more
likely to identify the suspect in the target-present condition (76.9%) compared to the
target-absent condition (28.8%), Wald(1) = 36.63, p < .001, OR = 8.65. More
importantly, results indicated the inclusion of the interaction term significantly improved
model fit, χ2(1, N = 177) = 8.33, p < .001. The model correctly classified 74.6% of
witnesses’ suspect identifications and accounted for a large amount of variance
(Nagelkerke R = .33). Individually, the model indicated the interaction term accounted
for a unique amount of variance, Wald(1) = 7.62, p = .006, OR = 8.55. For those in the
target-absent condition, simple main effects indicated choosers were significantly more
likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (40.5%) compared to the no-cue
condition (12.9%), Wald(1) = 6.02, p = .01, OR = 4.60. In contrast, for witnesses in the
target-present condition, simple main effects indicated witnesses were equally likely to
identify the suspect in the cue-target condition (70.5%) compared to the no-cue condition
(81.7%), Wald(1) = 1.77, p = .18, OR = 0.54. See Table 1 for probability and odds of
suspect identification by condition. Thus, the non-memorial cue changed the distribution
of choices in target-absent but not target-present lineups.
Increase in choosing rates. The second explanation is that the non-memorial cue
leads witnesses who would not have made an identification to now identify the suspect.
To examine this explanation I regressed the likelihood of making an identification
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(choice) on non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue) and lineup type (target-present, targetabsent).
Results indicated there was a significant main effect of lineup type on choice,
such that witnesses were significantly more likely to make an identification in the targetpresent condition (85.3%) compared to the target-absent condition (59.8%), Wald(1) =
18.54, p < .001, OR = 3.90. The effect of cue on choice was not significant, Wald(1) =
0.01, p = .93, OR = 0.97. See Table 2 for probability and odds of making an identification
by condition. Furthermore, results indicated the inclusion of the interaction term
significantly improved model fit, χ2(1, N = 244) = 4.01, p = .05. The model correctly
classified 72.5% of participants’ choice decisions and accounted for a large amount of
variance (Nagelkerke R = .14). Individually, the model indicated the interaction term
significantly accounted for a unique amount of variance, Wald(1) = 3.92, p = .05, OR =
3.56. For witnesses in the target-present condition, simple main effects indicated
witnesses were equally likely to make a choice in the cue-target condition (80.0%)
compared to the no-cue condition (89.6%), Wald(1) = 2.13, p = .15, OR = 0.47.
Similarly, for witnesses in the target-absent condition, simple main effects indicated
witnesses were equally likely to make a choice in the cue-target condition (65.6%)
compared to the no-cue condition (53.5%), Wald(1) = 1.87, p = .17, OR = 1.66.
The above analyses indicated that the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect
identifications was the result of the non-memorial cue redistributing the identifications of
choosers, rather than leading non-choosers to identify the suspect.
Filler identifications. Because I hypothesized the non-memorial cue should lead
to an increase of the cued lineup member and I counterbalanced the cue among two fillers
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(filler 1 or filler 6), two separate analyses were needed to examine the effect of the nonmemorial cue on filler identifications. That is, when filler 1 was cued I regressed filler 1
identifications (i.e., chose filler 1) on non-memorial cue (cue-filler, no-cue) and lineup
type (target-present, target-absent) and when filler 6 was cued we regressed filler 6
identifications (i.e., chose filler 6) on non-memorial cue (cue-filler, no-cue) and lineup
type (target-present, target-absent).
Filler 1 identifications. Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on
filler 1 identifications was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.53, p = .47, OR = 1.43. However,
witnesses were more likely to identify filler 1 in the target-absent condition (17.4%)
compared to the target-present condition (3.0%), Wald(1) = 8.56, p = .003, OR = 6.67.
The interaction term could not be computed because no witnesses in the cue-filler/targetpresent condition selected filler 1 (see Table 3 for probabilities) which makes logistic
regression problematic when you have categorical predictors with limited cases in each
category (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). To examine the effect of the non-memorial cue on
filler 1 identifications I conducted a chi-square analysis for only those witnesses in the
target-absent condition, where enough cases were present in each category. Results
indicated witnesses in the cue-filler condition (23.5%) and the no-cue condition (13.8%)
were equally likely to identify filler 1, χ2(1, N = 92) = 1.41, p = .23, ϕ2 = .01.
Filler 6 identifications. Results indicated the main effect of non-memorial cue on
filler 6 identifications was not significant, Wald(1) = 0.21, p = .65, OR = 1.29. However,
witnesses were more likely to identify filler 6 in the target-absent condition (15.5%)
compared to the target-present condition (1.9%), Wald(1) = 8.73, p = .003, OR = 9.90.
Again, the interaction term could not be computed because of limited cases in the cue-
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filler/no-cue target-present conditions (see Table 3 for probabilities). To examine the
effect of the non-memorial cue on filler 6 identifications I conducted a chi-square
analysis for only those witnesses in the target-absent condition, where enough cases were
present in each category. Results indicated witnesses in the cue-filler condition (19.2%)
and the no-cue condition (13.8%) were equally likely to identify filler 6, χ2(1, N = 84) =
0.41, p = .52, ϕ2 = .005. Although the data do not show a significant effect of the nonmemorial cue on filler identifications, the direction of the effects are in the predicted
direction and sample size is certainly limiting the power of these analyses.
In sum, the choosing behavior data indicated that the non-memorial cue affected
suspect identifications and that the effect seems to be the result of the non-memorial cue
altering the distribution of choices as opposed to increasing choosing overall. Recall, the
criterion shift explanation would predict the presence of a non-memorial cue would affect
choosing behavior by lowering a witness’s decision criterion. However, the
aforementioned data is inconsistent with this prediction for two reasons. First, if the
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was the result of lowering a
witness’s decision criterion then the presence of the cue should have led to increased
suspect identifications across both lineup types (i.e., target-present and target-absent).
Second, altering a witness’s decision criterion will either increase (when it is lowered) or
decrease (when it is raised) choosing rates, but importantly, it will not alter the
distribution of lineup choices. That is, the lineup member who is the best match to the
witness’s memory will always be picked at the highest rate regardless of a witness’s
decision criterion.
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Similarity Ratings
Recall, that the CCC predicts the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing
behavior will occur via leading witnesses to deliberatively infer who the suspect is
whereas the WITNESS model predicts that non-memorial cues will lead a witness to
reassess the match values of the various lineup members, thus potentially changing who
appears most similar to the witness’s memory of the perpetrator. Consistent with CCC
predictions, I hypothesized the perceived similarity between the suspect’s lineup
photograph and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator would not mediate the effect of
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications (Hypothesis 2).
To examine whether perceived similarity between the suspect’s lineup photograph
and the witness’s memory of the perpetrator mediated the effect of the non-memorial cue
on suspect identifications I used a robust modeling tool called PROCESS (Hayes, 2013).
Process uses the bootstrapping method (1,000 bootstrap samples in the current analysis)
to generate bias-corrected confidence intervals for testing the indirect effects (i.e., the
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications through perceived suspect
similarity). Of note, because earlier analyses showed that the effect of the non-memorial
cue on suspect identifications was moderated by lineup type I conducted a mediation for
each lineup type. Thus, the models consisted of the predictor variable X (non-memorial
cue: cue-target, no-cue), the mediator variable M (perceived similarity of the suspect),
and the outcome variable Y (suspect identification: yes, no) for both target-present and
target-absent lineups, separately.
Target-present mediation model. Results indicated (N = 121) the total effect of
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was marginally significant, b = -0.72, SE
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= .39, p = .06 (see Figure 1). Of note, current thinking about mediation does not require a
statistically significant total effect for mediation to be present (Hayes, 2013). Thus,
witnesses were less likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target condition compared to
the no-cue condition. The direct effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect
identifications, while controlling for the perceived similarity of the suspect, was not
statistically significant, b = -0.79, SE = .59, p = .17. Furthermore, the indirect effect of
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications through the perceived similarity of the
suspect was not statistically different from zero as evidenced by a 95% bias-corrected
bootstrap confidence interval (bootLLCI = -1.58 to bootULCI = 0.29), b = -0.60, SE =
.49. Consistent with predictions, the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect
identifications was not mediated by the perceived similarity of the suspect; witnesses in
the cue-target condition did not perceive a significantly different level of similarity
between the suspect and the perpetrator than witnesses in the no-cue condition, b = -0.69,
SE = .51, p = .17. In sum, the current pattern of data support the predictions of the
WITNESS model and not the CCC.
Target-absent mediation model. Results indicated (N = 122) the total effect of
the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was statistically significant, b = 1.59, SE
= .59, p = .007. Thus, witnesses were more likely to identify the suspect in the cue-target
condition compared to the no-cue condition. The direct effect of the non-memorial cue on
suspect identifications, while controlling for the perceived similarity of the suspect, was
statistically significant, b = 1.38, SE = .67, p = .04. Furthermore, the indirect effect of the
non-memorial cue on suspect identifications through the perceived similarity of the
suspect was statistically different from zero as evidenced by a 95% bias-corrected
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bootstrap confidence interval (bootLLCI = 0.05 to bootULCI = 1.41), b = 0.62, SE = .35.
Again consistent with predictions, the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect
identifications was only partially mediated by the perceived similarity of the suspect.
Specifically, witnesses in the cue-target condition perceived the suspect as more similar
to their memory of the perpetrator, which in turn influenced suspect identifications.
Witnesses who rated the suspect as more similar to their memory of the perpetrator were
more likely to identify the suspect. However, because this was only a partial mediation,
this suggests that the cue’s effect on suspect identifications was also being driven by an
inferential process. In sum, the current pattern of data support the predictions of both the
CCC and the WITNESS model.
Confidence
The CCC makes specific predictions regarding the effect of the non-memorial cue
on witness confidence levels. Recall that when the non-memorial cue corroborates the
witness’s identification decision (i.e., when their identification was of a cued lineup
member) this should increase confidence, whereas when the non-memorial cue competes
with the witness’s identification decision (i.e., when their identification was of a noncued lineup member) this should decrease confidence. Both of these effects should be
greater in the weak ecphoric experience condition than the strong ecphoric experience
condition (Hypothesis 3).
To examine this prediction I conducted a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. To
establish whether the non-memorial cue was corroborating (cue-target) or competing
(cue-filler) with witnesses’ identification decision only suspect identifiers were included
in this analysis. Also, because so few witnesses identified the suspect in the cue-
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filler/target-absent (n = 3) and no-cue/target-absent (n = 4) conditions only witnesses in
the target-present condition were included in this analysis. Thus, I examined the effect of
a corroborating and competing cue by examining the effect of the non-memorial cue
(cue-target, cue-filler, no-cue) on confidence, including only target-present suspect
identifiers in the analysis.
Results indicated there was a significant effect of non-memorial cue on
confidence, F(2, 122) = 3.84, p = .02, η2 = .06. Tukey HSD tests indicated mean
confidence in a suspect identification was significantly greater for witnesses in the cuetarget condition (M = 77.90, SD = 15.96) versus witnesses in the cue-filler condition (M =
67.40, SD = 16.80), p = .03. However, all other comparisons were non-significant (see
Table 4 for descriptive statistics), although the means were trending in the predicted
direction. One possible factor contributing to the non-significance of these results is the
significant amount of variation within each group. Also, remember the CCC predicts the
effect of the non-memorial cue on confidence would be stronger in the weak ecphoric
experience condition (target-absent) rather than the strong ecphoric experience condition
(target-present). Thus, only being able to assess these effects in the strong ecphoric
experience condition (because of sample size issues in target-absent lineups), makes it
more difficult to reveal any effects. Regardless, these results support the CCC’s
predictions regarding the corroborating/competing nature of the non-memorial cue on
confidence reports.
Decision Time
The CCC predicts that even when witnesses have a strong ecphoric experience,
witnesses will still engage is some level of inferential processes (Hypothesis 4). Thus, it
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was predicted that the presence of a non-memorial cue would significantly increase
decision time but that this effect would be greater in the target-absent condition than the
target-present condition. Because this prediction does not specify differential effects for
the non-memorial cue conditions (i.e., cue-target, cue-filler) on decision time, I collapsed
across the two cued conditions to make a combined cue condition (i.e., cue-target and
cue-filler were combined into one condition). To test this prediction I conducted a 2
(lineup type: target-present, target-absent) x 2 (non-memorial cue: cue-present, no-cue)
between-subjects factorial ANOVA.
To correct for non-normality decision time was transformed using a logarithm
function. Also, I removed several significant outliers (i.e., cases that were more than three
standard deviations from the mean). In total four cases were removed: one from the
target-present/cue-present condition, two from the target-present/no-cue condition, and
one from the target-absent/no-cue condition.
Results indicated the mean decision time was significantly greater for witnesses in
the cue-present condition (M s = 24.28, SD = 17.55) versus witnesses in the no-cue
condition (M = 20.68, SD = 17.75), F(1, 368) = 4.59, p = .03, η p 2 = .01. The mean
decision time was significantly lower for witnesses in the target-present (M s = 19.48, SD
= 14.53) versus witnesses in the target-absent condition (M s = 26.91, SD = 19.81), F(1,
368) = 16.65, p < .001, η p 2 = .04. Last, the interaction effect was not significant, F(1,
368) = 0.16, p = .69, η p 2 < .001. See Table 5 for descriptive statistics for each condition.
In sum, these results provide partial support for my hypothesis. The presence of a cue did
increase decision time, however, the effect was not moderated by lineup type.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this study was to test whether witness choosing behavior is
driven simply by memorial factors or by a combination of both memorial factors and
non-memorial inferential processes. I also examined whether the effect of non-memorial
cues on choosing behavior would be dependent upon the strength of the witnesses’
ecphoric experience. Data across two studies indicated that witness choosing behavior
was driven not only by memorial factors, but also by non-memorial factors as well, and
importantly, that the effect of non-memorial factors was moderated by the strength of
witnesses’ ecphoric experience. Study 1 showed that mock-witnesses, who have no actual
memory of the perpetrator, engaged in an inferential process by using the presence of a
non-memorial cue in the lineup to help guide their choosing behavior. However, the fact
that these mock-witnesses, by definition, do not actually have a memory of the
perpetrator prevents any conclusions from being drawn about how real witnesses’
choosing behavior will be affected by such non-memorial cues. The findings from study
2 provided a stronger test of how real witnesses’ choosing behavior is affected by nonmemorial cues.
Choosing Behavior
The presence of the non-memorial cue on the target significantly increased
suspect identifications compared to its absence, but only when the witness had a weak
ecphoric experience (i.e., target-absent condition). In fact, the odds of identifying the
suspect were nearly five times greater when the non-memorial cue was on the target
compared to when it was not on the target. Interestingly, when the witness had a strong
ecphoric experience (i.e., target-present condition) the presence of the non-memorial cue
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on the target significantly decreased suspect identifications compared when there was no
non-memorial cue present. The odds of identifying the target were about half as great
when the non-memorial cue was on the target compared to when it was not on the target.
Consistent with predictions, these effects indicate the effect of the non-memorial cue on
choosing behavior was greater when the witness had a weak ecphoric experience
compared to a strong ecphoric experience.
Whereas the non-memorial cue and lineup type combined to affect suspect
identifications, the non-memorial cue, either alone or in combination with lineup type,
did not affect filler identifications. One possible explanation for this null effect is that
witnesses were less likely to report noticing the cue when it was on a filler (46%) versus
when it was on the target (71%). Obviously for the non-memorial cue to be effective it
must be noticed by witnesses; had more witnesses noticed the cue on the filler, I may
have observed a significant effect on filler identifications.
Nonetheless, the effect of a non-memorial cue on suspect identifications was
greater when witnesses had a weak ecphoric experience. An important questions remains:
Which theoretical explanation(s) (i.e., criterion shift, reassessment of match values, or
inferential-based) can best account for the current data?
Theoretical Frameworks
Clearly the data in the present study indicated witnesses’ choosing behavior was
driven by both memorial (e.g., strength of the witnesses’ ecphoric experience) and
inferential (e.g., the presence of the non-memorial cue) processes. Three theoretical
explanations have been proposed to account for eyewitness choosing behavior. Because
each explanation predicts that the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior will
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result in a specific pattern of choosing behavior, direct comparisons among the
explanations can be made to assess which theoretical perspective can best account for the
data.
Criterion shift. The first explanation attempts to account for non-memorial
processes via a change in a witness’s decision criterion. For instance, the aforementioned
cognitive models (i.e., dual-process recognition models and SDT) and the WITNESS
model predict that the presence of a non-memorial cue would lead witnesses to lower
their decision criterion compared when there is no non-memorial cue, resulting in an
increase in choosing rates overall. And since the target should tend to be the best match
to a witness’s memory, then a lowered decision criterion would result in an increase in
target identifications in particular. This is because a downward criterion shift would lead
low confidence witnesses to choose more often but it would not alter which lineup
member they would choose. Three specific patterns of data exist within the current study
that are inconsistent with a criterion shift explanation.
First, the presence of a non-memorial cue on the target resulted in opposite effects
on suspect identifications across lineup type. Specifically, a non-memorial on the target
decreased suspect identifications from target-present lineups but increased suspect
identifications from target-absent lineups. This pattern is inconsistent with a criterion
shift because lowering a witness’s criterion will lead to increased choosing in both targetpresent and target-absent lineups. And because the target will tend to be the best
memorial match this will result in an increase in suspect identifications in both lineup
types.

52

Second, if the presence of a non-memorial cue affected suspect identifications via
a criterion shift then they would have changed choosing rates. Inconsistent with this
explanation results indicated the presence of a non-memorial cue on the target did not
affect choosing rates compared to its absence for either witnesses who viewed a targetabsent or target-present lineup.
Third, the findings indicated that the non-memorial cue changed the distribution
of responses: Witnesses who would have identified a filler instead identified the target
when the target was cued. In other words, the cue changed the distribution of
identifications among choosers. This is inconsistent with a criterion shift explanation: A
criterion shift can explain a change in the proportion of witnesses who make an
identification, but cannot account for a change in who witnesses identify.
Reassessment of match values. The second theoretical framework predicts that
the presence of a non-memorial cue will lead witnesses to reassess the importance of
certain matching and mismatching facial features leading witnesses to alter which lineup
member is the best match to their memory of the perpetrator (Clark et al., 2009). In other
words, this prediction can account for data showing an increase in suspect identifications
from target-absent lineups as well as a concomitant decrease in suspect identifications
from target-present lineups. For example, it could be that in target-absent lineups the nonmemorial cue on the target led witnesses to reassess the match values, increasing the
perceived match of the target and their memory of the perpetrator, and resulting in
increased choosing of the suspect. In contrast, it could be that in target-present lineups the
non-memorial cue on the target led witnesses to reassess the match values, decreasing the
perceived match of the target and their memory of the perpetrator, and resulting in
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decreased choosing of the suspect. This framework thus appears consistent with the
choosing data. Importantly, for this prediction to be supported by the data witnesses’
perceived similarity of the suspect must at a minimum partially mediate the effect of the
non-memorial cue on suspect identifications. Mediation analyses provided partial support
for this framework. Specifically, suspect similarity did not mediate the effect of the nonmemorial cue on suspect identifications for witnesses in the target-present condition but
did partially mediate the effect in target-absent lineups. Thus, although it appears the
effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications may be partly the result of a reassessment of match values, at least for target-absent lineups, this framework cannot fully
explain the current pattern of data.
Inferential based framework. According to the CCC, witness choosing behavior
will be driven by both memorial and non-memorial factors, with the effect of nonmemorial cues being moderated by the ecphoric experience of the witness. Importantly,
unlike the re-assessment of match values framework, the CCC predicts that the effect of a
non-memorial cue will be partly driven by an inferential process. That is, the nonmemorial cue will not only affect choosing behavior by altering a witness’s perceived
similarity between a lineup member and their memory of the perpetrator, but will also do
so via an inferential deliberative process. For example, a witness may infer that the
circled lineup member is likely the perpetrator because one of the other witnesses already
identified him.
Mediation analyses indicated that the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect
identifications in target-absent lineups was only partly accounted for by similarity ratings
and the effect of the non-memorial cue on suspect identifications in target-absent lineups
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was not mediated by similarity ratings. This suggests that the non-memorial cue is
affecting choosing behavior through some other process besides a reassessment of match
values. The pattern of data in both target-present and target-absent lineups can be
explained via the inferential based explanation proposed by the CCC, which explains the
observed data in the following way.
First, witnesses in the target-absent condition tended to have a weak ecphoric
experience which led them to engage in inferential processing to aid their decisionmaking. This would have led them to notice that one of the lineup members was circled,
which may result in a reassessment of the similarity between the cued lineup member and
their memory of the perpetrator. However, the re-weighting of certain features may not
always provide enough of a change in similarity to provide enough basis to identify this
individual. Witnesses may also have then searched for non-memorial cues to help them
determine the identity of the suspect in the lineup. They may have reasoned that because
lineup member two was circled, that another witness identified that lineup member, and
therefore inferred that he must be the perpetrator.
Second, witnesses in the target-present condition tended to have a strong ecphoric
experience which led them to engage in less inferential processing to aid their decisionmaking. This would have led them to notice that one of the lineup members was circled,
which may result in a reassessment of the similarity between the cued lineup member and
their memory of the perpetrator. But because these witnesses tended to have a strong
ecphoric experience the presence of a non-memorial cue on the target would not likely
alter similarity ratings. At this point, the CCC would predict witnesses searched for other
non-memorial reasons to aid in their decision making. Again, I found evidence for this.
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Witnesses who had a strong ecphoric experience reasoned that because lineup member
two was circled this must be a trick and thus were less likely to choose. This latter
finding, although unexpected, is still consistent with the inferential based framework.
One possible explanation is that witnesses in the target-present condition, who are more
likely to have a strong ecphoric experience, could be experiencing a form of
psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966). Psychological reactance theory states that when
an individual’s freedom is threatened they will react by rebelling against that threat.
Applied to these data, when the target is in the lineup witnesses have a strong ecphoric
experience and want to choose the target. However, the presence of a non-memorial cue
on the target may lead some witnesses to infer that their freedom to choose who they
want is being threatened and thus experience reactance thereby resisting the perceived
influence of the non-memorial cue, and as a result, choose to identify another lineup
member. If true, this is consistent with the idea that witnesses engaged in an inferencebased process: a cue may have led them to infer that the cued suspect could not be the
target.
Decision time and confidence. Aside from the choosing behavior data, the
predictions regarding the effect of the non-memorial cue on both decision time and
witness confidence made by the CCC were generally supported. First, when a nonmemorial cue was present witnesses took significantly more time to make a decision
compared to when there was no cue. Second, when witnesses identified the suspect they
reported a significantly higher level of confidence when the non-memorial cue was on the
target compared to when the non-memorial cue was on a filer. These findings both
provide further support for the inferential based framework proposed by the CCC.
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Clearly, the decision criterion shift explanation is unable to account for the data.
The re-assessment of match values explanation was able to account for some of the data,
but the CCC appears to provide the best fit for the data. Of note, the CCC and the
WITNESS model are not necessarily exclusive, and can in fact be reconciled. For
example, because the WITNESS model is a mathematical model it is relatively simple to
incorporate the role that inferential based processing has on choosing behavior by adding
a parameter to account for it within the model (although it currently has yet to do so).
However, some important differences exist that I argue should lead researchers to prefer
the CCC model.
First, the CCC offers a more general framework for researchers to work with
because it makes the same predictions as the WITNESS model when there are no nonmemorial cues to drive inferential processing. Note that the WITNESS model was
derived mostly by data obtained from studies in which the researchers deliberately
avoided adding any non-memorial cues in the lineups as to the identity of the suspect.
The WITNESS model is able to account for these data fairly well; however, I argue that
when non-memorial cues do exist, the CCC does a better job accounting for their effects.
Second, compared to the WITNESS model, the CCC provides more specific explanations
for the effect of manipulations on other witness-related variables (e.g., confidence,
decision time, etc.). Although the WITNESS model can be extended to account for these
outcomes variables, it currently focuses primarily on choosing behavior, in contrast to the
CCC, which accounts for both choosing and confidence. Third, the WITNESS model
cannot fully account for the current data. For example, the WITNESS model predicts the
effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior occurs via a re-assessment of match
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values. However, the effect of the cue in target-present data was not explained via a reassessment of match values. It appears that the effect of the cue, at least in target-present
lineups, was the result of a purely inferential process. Fourth, the CCC is able to account
for choosing behavior of both actual witnesses and mock-witnesses whereas the
WITNESS model cannot account for mock-witness choosing behavior because it relies
on match values.
A good scientific theory needs to not only make novel predictions and drive
future research but it must also account for existent data and the CCC is able to do so.
First, clothing bias (i.e., when only one of the lineup members is dressed similarly to how
the perpetrator was at the time of the crime) has been demonstrated to increase false
identifications without affecting correct identifications (Lindsay, Wallbridge, & Drennan,
1987). According to the CCC, witnesses in the target-present condition will not be
affected by the clothing bias because they have a strong ecphoric experience, resulting in
less reliance on inferential processing. However, those in the target-absent lineup should
have a relatively weak ecphoric experience and should therefore search for non-memorial
information, using an inferential process to aid their decision-making. Thus, according to
the CCC the negative effect that clothing bias has on false identifications is the result of
an inferential process. Accordingly, the CCC would predict that preventing witnesses’
ability to engage in an inferential process should mitigate the negative effect of clothing
bias. Indeed, Lindsay et al. (1991) found that using the sequential lineup procedure
mitigated the effect clothing bias was having on false identifications. The CCC can
account for this: When the pictures were presented all at once (i.e., using the
simultaneous procedure) witnesses could use their inferential processing within this
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context to compare the pictures with each other and infer that the lineup member who is
dressed in the same clothing must be the perpetrator. In contrast, when the lineup
procedure removed this context by presenting the pictures individually (i.e., using the
sequential procedure) this reduced witnesses’ ability to use a deliberative process to infer
on the basis of the clothing bias who the suspect was.
Second, witness are more likely to choose from a lineup when the administrator
was not blind compared to when they were blind (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Phillips,
McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999). Also, witnesses – especially those with weaker
memories – appear to look for indications from the lineup administrator as to the identity
of the suspect in the lineup when they are motivated to make an identification
(Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). These results are consistent with the inferential-based
framework in that witnesses in the target-present condition will not be strongly affected
by the administrators influence because they have a strong ecphoric experience, resulting
in less reliance on inferential processing. However, witnesses who view a target-absent
lineup should have a relatively weak ecphoric experience and should therefore search for
non-memorial information, using an inferential process to aid their decision-making.
Thus, according to the CCC the double-blind procedure mitigates the negative effects of
administrator influence.
Third, a recent finding showed evidence of a novel postdictor of eyewitness
accuracy. Charman and Cahill (2012) reasoned that witnesses who view a target-present
lineup will be more likely to have a strong ecphoric experience which tends to be
associated with accurate identifications. However, witnesses who view a target-absent
lineup will be more likely to have a weak ecphoric experience which tends to be
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associated with inaccurate identifications. As a consequence of the strength of the
ecphoric experience, witnesses will differ in their memory of the fillers in the lineup:
Witnesses who have a strong ecphoric experience will not need to engage in inferential
processing (i.e., they won’t spend much time looking at the fillers) whereas witnesses
who have a weak ecphoric experience will engage in inferential processing (i.e., they will
spend time looking at the fillers). Thus, the extent to which witnesses engage in
inferential processing will lead to detectable differences in their memory of the fillers in
the lineup, with greater memory for fillers indicative of more inferential processing.
Indeed, results indicated witnesses’ memory for fillers significantly postdicted
identification accuracy: The more fillers remembered, the more likely the witness was to
have made a false identification. These results are consistent with the inferential-based
framework and show independent evidence that the level of inferential processing
engaged by witnesses is dependent upon their ecphoric experience.
Practical Implications
These data provide important implications for gathering eyewitness data in the
real world. First, data suggest that non-memorial cues provide no benefit to the reliability
of eyewitness identifications. Of the non-memorial cues examined in the literature (e.g.,
clothing bias, administrative influence, co-witness information, lineup bias, etc.), all lead
to an increase in false identifications without affecting correct identifications. Indeed, the
non-memorial cue in the current studies increased false identifications while
simultaneously decreasing correct identifications. This consistent pattern of data shows
that the presence of a non-memorial cue is actually counterproductive to the purpose of a
lineup. In a real investigation the purpose of a lineup is to provide probative value
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regarding the guilt of the suspect in the lineup (Charman & Wells, 2007a). This can be
accomplished by calculating a diagnosticity ratio, which is the proportion of correct
identifications divided by the proportion of false identifications (Wells & Lindsay, 1980).
Therefore, by increasing false identifications without increasing correct identifications (or
even decreasing correct identifications, as in Study 2), the presence of non-memorial cues
tend to reduce the diagnosticity of lineups (and hence the probative value of an
identification). Indeed, the diagnosticity ratio was lower when the non-memorial cue was
on the target (2.12) than when there was no non-memorial cue (11.03). As a result police
should strive to remove as many non-memorial influences as possible as they offer no
benefit. For example, the non-memorial cue used in the present study is essentially cowitness information. In real life there are often multiple witnesses to a crime and
therefore it would behoove officers to prevent witnesses from communicating with each
other, particularly about their lineup identification decision.
Second, consistent with the CCC, the current data indicate that non-memorial
cues have a greater effect when a witness has a weak ecphoric experience. Because a
witness’s ecphoric experience is driven by both their memory strength and the match
between the lineup members and their memory of the perpetrator, research studies may
be showing a greater effect of non-memorial cues on choosing than would be shown
among real-world witnesses. For instance, in almost all eyewitness studies, all witnesses,
regardless of their reported quality of memory, are shown a lineup and asked to make an
identification. In contrast, in real life cases, particularly ones with multiple witnesses,
police officers will often only show lineups to witnesses that self-report having had a
high quality memory of the perpetrator. All other factors being equal, empirical findings

61

of various non-memorial cues will likely reveal a greater effect because real life
witnesses who will tend to have a weaker ecphoric experience are never shown a lineup.
Thus, the effects we show in the laboratory may in fact be overestimating the impact of
non-memorial factors on eyewitness accuracy.
Relatedly, the method used by both researchers and expert witnesses to measure
the effect non-memorial cues have on witness choosing behavior – the mock-witness
paradigm – may tend to overestimate bias. Mock-witnesses by definition have no
memory of the perpetrator; thus, they must use a purely inferential process to make an
identification decision. As a result, mock witness paradigms should show a strong effect
of non-memorial cues on identification rates, producing large estimates of bias. However,
this paradigm may be overestimating the influence any given non-memorial cue is having
on witness choosing behavior: Since real world witnesses have a memory of a
perpetrator, they should tend to experience some degree of an ecphoric experience when
viewing a lineup (particularly a target-present lineup), making them less susceptible to
the effect of non-memorial cues.
Third, the framework of the CCC does offer at least one simple safeguard for
police officers to help mitigate the effect of non-memorial cues. When constructing a
lineup they should ensure that they include a current photograph of the suspect. Again, a
witness’s ecphoric experience is driven by both their memory strength and the ecphoric
match between the lineup members and their memory of the perpetrator. While
investigators have no control over the memorial experience of their witnesses they can
increase the chances that a witness will have a strong ecphoric experience by using
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current photographs in the lineup; this in turn should make witnesses less susceptible to
non-memorial cues in the lineup, thus increasing their accuracy overall.
Limitations
There are at two important limitations of the present work. First, to examine
CCC’s prediction of the non-memorial cue on confidence, we had to examine only
witnesses who made a suspect identification. But this is a self-selected variable; in other
words, we did not force witnesses to choose. As a consequence, because the rates of
choosing the suspect differed across cue conditions (i.e., the cue-target condition resulted
in more suspect identifications than the no-cue condition), we lose random assignment to
condition. As a result, causal conclusions are impossible to draw as to the effect of a
competing or corroborating cue on confidence in an identification. Future research could
attempt to control for suspect identification. For example, Wells, Bradfield, and Olson
(2002) successfully manipulated witness accuracy by (a) forcing all witnesses to choose,
and (b) including a highly similar innocent suspect in target-absent lineups. As a
consequence, the vast majority of witness identified the target. A similar procedure may
be useful in testing the CCC’s predictions regarding competing and corroborating cues on
witness confidence.
Second, the use of only one type of non-memorial cue limits the generalizability
of these data. It is unknown whether the observed patterns of data will occur across the
myriad possible non-memorial cues. Indeed, data from Study 1 indicated that only certain
non-memorial cues affected choosing behavior. Why did some of the cues affect
choosing behavior while others did not? Future research should address this question.
One possible explanation is that a non-memorial cue will only affect choosing behavior
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insofar that the inferential process indicates to the witness that the cue possesses
diagnostic information. Study 1 provided preliminary support for this explanation. For
example, contrast the circle non-memorial cue (which showed an effect on choosing)
with the tilted non-memorial cue (which did not show an effect on choosing). It is easier
to see that a person might assume that the reason why a lineup member is circled is
because someone else believes that is the perpetrator. However, a picture being tilted at
an angle in a lineup may be less likely to convey any diagnostic information as to the
identity of the suspect. Future research should examine witnesses’ attributions for the
reasons why cues are present in the lineup, and whether those attributions moderate the
effect of cues on choosing behavior.
Future Directions
The ultimate goal of eyewitness researchers is to develop procedures that help to
increase correct identifications and reduce false identifications. It is clear that few
procedures within the literature have had much success in increasing hits, whereas the
majority of procedures that have been recommended have been beneficial at reducing
false identifications. This is likely because it is difficult to develop a procedure that
fosters a stronger ecphoric experience because witnesses’ ecphoric experience is
dependent largely upon their quality of memory, which cannot be controlled by the legal
system. However, there may exist ways to increase ecphoric experience. For example,
using clear photographs in a lineup that accurately depict the appearance of the
perpetrator at the time of the crime and reducing the retention interval between the crime
and the lineup task should both help a witness have a relatively strong ecphoric
experience if shown a target-present lineup. Thus, future research should investigate
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these and other possible ways to increase the level of ecphoric experience a witness may
have.
According to the inferential-based framework, many of the various manipulations
in the literature that increase false identifications do so because witnesses engage in
inferential processing, particularly when they have a weak ecphoric experience. Thus,
procedures and/or instructions that discourage witnesses from engaging in inferential
processing would be extremely impactful. Perhaps an additional lineup instruction
instructing witnesses to avoid inferential processing could prevent this detrimental
deliberative processing, and thus improve the diagnosticity of lineup identifications. This
could even be accomplished by modifying the wording of the recommended unbiased
instructions. For example, the following instruction may help prevent inferential-based
processing: “Please keep in mind that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the
lineup. Also, keep in mind your task is to use your memory to make your lineup decision
not to use other non-memory based factors”. Not only should this instruction reduce the
likelihood of false identifications itself, but it should also help mitigate the negative
effects of inferential processing.
There are likely multiple factors driving a witness to use inferential processing but
one obvious factor is that of motivation. Witnesses who view a lineup are motivated for
various reasons (e.g., justice, self-esteem boost, belief in a just world) to make an
identification from a lineup. The very nature of the task likely implies to witnesses that
the guilty party is in the lineup and therefore it is their job to simply identify the
perpetrator. Surprisingly, very little research has investigated the role of motivation in
witness choosing behavior. And although some manipulations, such as unbiased
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instructions, are designed to reduce the belief that lineups always contain the actual
perpetrator, witnesses still tend to make false identifications even when given those
unbiased instructions, suggesting that they are nonetheless motivated to pick someone
from the lineup. Thus, future research would be well guided to develop new lineup
methods that specifically reduce the role motivation plays in witness choosing behavior.
Indeed, it is possible, and consistent with the CCC, that motivation plays a crucial causal
role in the effect of non-memorial cues on choosing behavior. Specifically, witnesses
who have a weak ecphoric experience may be more likely to engage in inferential
processing only if they are motivated to make an identification; thus, motivated witnesses
who experience a weak ecphoric experience are the witnesses who will be affected most
by non-memorial cues. A witness who has a weak ecphoric experience but is not highly
motivated may not engage in inferential processing and may be more likely to (correctly)
reject the lineup. Future research should examine whether the effect of non-memorial
cues on identification accuracy is moderated by a witness’s motivation to make an
identification.
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Footnote
1

This description of a sequential lineup procedure omits several other defining

features, for a more complete description of the lineup procedure see Lindsay & Wells
(1985).

74

Table 1
Probability and Odds of Identifying the Suspect by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup Type
All Witnesses
Cue Target

No Cue

Target Present

.563a (n = 55)

.761b (n = 67)

Target Absent

.265a (n = 64)

.069b (n = 58)

Target Present

1.292

2.722

Target Absent

0.3617

0.074

Cue Target

No Cue

Target Present

.705a (n = 44)

.817a (n = 60)

Target Absent

.405a (n = 42)

.129b (n = 31)

Target Present

2.384

4.456

Target Absent

0.680

0.148

Probability

Odds

Choosers

Probability

Odds

Note. Within each row, probabilities with different superscripts differ at p ≤ .05
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Table 2
Probability and Odds of Making an Identification by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup
Type
Cue Target

No Cue

Target Present

.80a (n = 55)

.896a (n = 67)

Target Absent

.656a (n = 64)

.535a (n = 58)

Target Present

4.00

8.569

Target Absent

1.909

1.148

Probability

Odds

Note. Within each row, probabilities with different superscripts differ at p < .05
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Table 3
Probability and Odds of Identifying the Cued Filler by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup
Type
Filler 1 Identifications
Cue Filler 1

No Cue

Target Present

.000 (n = 32)

.045 (n = 67)

Target Absent

.235 (n = 34)

.138 (n = 58)

Target Present

0.00

0.047

Target Absent

0.308

0.16

Cue Filler 6

No Cue

Target Present

.025 (n = 40)

.015 (n = 67)

Target Absent

.192 (n = 26)

.138 (n = 58)

Target Present

0.026

0.015

Target Absent

0.238

0.16

Probability

Odds

Filler 6 Identifications

Probability

Odds
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Table 4
Means (SDs) of Witness Confidence Reports by Non-memorial Cue

Cue Target

Cue Filler

No Cue

(n = 31)

(n = 45)

(n = 49)

77.90a (15.96)

67.40b (16.80)

73.71ab (17.11)

Note. Means with different superscripts differ at p < .05
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Table 5
Means (SDs) of Witness Decision Time by Non-memorial Cue and Lineup Type

Target Present

Combined Cue

No Cue

20.65 (14.74)

17.22 (13.96)

n = 126

n = 65

27.97 (19.38)

24.62 (20.70)

n = 124

n = 57

Target Absent
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Non-Memorial
Cue

Suspect
Identification
b = -0.72

a) Direct Pathway

Perceived Similarity of
the Suspect
b = 0.86*

b = -0.69

Non-Memorial
Cue

Suspect
Identification
b = -0.79

b) Mediated Pathway

Figure 1. Target-present mediation model with predictor variable non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue), the mediator variable
perceived similarity of the suspect, and the outcome variable suspect identification (yes, no). Panel a represents the total effect of
non-memorial cue on suspect identification. Panel b represents the direct and indirect effects of non-memorial cue on suspect
identification. *p < .05
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Non-Memorial
Cue

Suspect
Identification
b = 1.59**

a) Direct Pathway

Perceived Similarity of
the Suspect
b = 1.11*

b = 0.56***

Non-Memorial
Cue

Suspect
Identification
b = 1.38*

b) Mediated Pathway

Figure 1. Target-absent mediation model with predictor variable non-memorial cue (cue-target, no-cue), the mediator variable
perceived similarity of the suspect, and the outcome variable suspect identification (yes, no). Panel a represents the total effect of
non-memorial cue on suspect identification. Panel b represents the direct and indirect effects of non-memorial cue on suspect
identification. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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VI. APPENDIX
Memory Questionnaire
RKG Judgments
Thinking back to your lineup identification decision. Please use the following
descriptions to indicate which option best reflects your experience in making your lineup
identification. Please carefully read each description before making your decision.
Remember: If you became consciously aware again of some aspect or aspects of what
happened or what was experienced at the time you viewed the video (e.g., aspects of the
physical appearance of the individual in the video, or of something that happened in the
room, or of what one was thinking or doing at that time). An example of a Remember
judgment would be when you recognize someone, and you remember talking to them at
the party you attended the previous weekend.
Know: If you recognized the thief from the video but you cannot recollect consciously
anything about its actual occurrence or what happened or what was experienced at the
time you viewed the video. An example of a Know judgment would be when you are
confident you recognize someone, because of strong feelings of familiarity, but you have
no recollection of seeing this person before. You cannot remember anything about them.
Guess: If your lineup identification was NOT accompanied by a conscious recollection of
its prior occurrence when you viewed the video NOR was it accompanied by any feelings
of familiarity. That is, your lineup identification was made based on an educated Guess.
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Open-ended Assessments of Decision Processes
Please describe why you made your lineup decision. That is, why did you choose X
lineup member or why did you choose the “not there option”.
Was there anything about the lineup that lead to your lineup decision other than your
memory of the target photo? If so, please explain.
Did one of the photos in the lineup “stand out” from the other photos in the lineup? If so,
please explain.
If you noticed that one of the photos in the lineup “stood out” from the other
photos in the lineup do you think this influenced your decision? If so, please
explain.
Did you notice that one of the photos in the lineup was circled?
If so, do you think this influenced your lineup decision? Please explain.
While viewing the lineup did you feel motivated to make an identification? If so, please
explain.

Imagine you witnessed a crime and the police ask you to view a lineup to see if you can
identify the perpetrator. Before viewing the lineup would you assume the actual
perpetrator is in the lineup?
If so, please explain why you think this and how you think this might affect your
lineup decision making.
Imagine you witnessed a crime and the police ask you to view a lineup to see if you can
identify the perpetrator and while you are looking at the lineup you fail to recognize any
of the lineup members. Would you then look for any clues either in the lineup or
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provided by the detective to help you figure out who the perpetrator is? If so, please
explain.
Endorsements of Decision Process
There are a number of different strategies witnesses may use when trying to make a
lineup identification. Some of these are listed below. You may have used all, some, or
none of these strategies. Please indicate which of the following strategies you used when
making your identification decision by placing an ‘X’ beside any of the strategies that
you used.
______

I compared facial features of each of the photos to my memory of the thief

______

His face just popped out at me

______

I first eliminated the ones definitely not him

______

I thought about reasons why the lineup members might be the thief

______

I just recognized him, I cannot explain why

______

I compared the photos to each other

______

I looked for a lineup member that matched my memory of the thief

______

I had to think to figure out my decision

_______

I picked the person who I reasoned the researchers wanted me to pick

The photos that you saw in the lineup may have had an impact on your decision in
various ways. Some of these ways are listed below. Please indicate which of the
following statements describes how the photos influenced your decision by placing an
‘X’ beside the statements that describes the photos’ influence. (You may indicate all,
some, or none of these statements).
______

They helped me to confirm/reinforce my decision after I made it
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______

They had little influence on my decision

______

They confused me; they made the task more difficult

______

They were all so similar that they made me less confident

Which of the following had a greater impact on your decision?
______

The photos in the lineup

______

My memory

Self-reported Viewing Conditions
How good of a view did you get of the thief?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very poor

10
Very good

When looking at the thief I actively tried to memorize his face.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly Disagree

10
Strongly Agree

Throughout the event I paid close attention to the thief’s face.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly Disagree

10
Strongly Agree

How clear is the image you have in your memory of the thief you saw in the video?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all clear

8

9

10
Very clear
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How distinctive was the thief’s face?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not at all Distinctive

10
Very Distinctive

Throughout the event I paid close attention to the thief’s actions.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly Disagree

10
Strongly Agree

How far away was the thief in the video?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Not far

10
Very far

During the event I found myself thinking about how the thief reminded me of someone
else.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly Disagree

9

10

Strongly Agree

Based on your memory of the thief’s face, how confident are you that you could pick the
thief out of a crowd of people?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all Confident

8

9

10
Completely Confident
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The thief’s face reminded me of someone I know.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly Disagree

10
Strongly Agree

During the event I made judgments about the thief because based on his facial
characteristics.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly Disagree

9

10

Strongly Agree

During the crime I found it difficult to pay attention to details.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly Disagree

10
Strongly Agree

Generally, how good is your recognition memory for the faces of strangers?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very poor

10
Excellent

How well were you able to make out specific features of the thief’s face from the video?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Not at all

8

9

10
Very well
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For how long would you estimate thief’s face was in view?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very little time

10
Quite a bit of time

I did not get a clear view of the thief’s face.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Strongly Disagree

9

10

Strongly Agree

During the event I found myself trying to understand why the thief was committing the
crime.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Strongly Disagree

10
Strongly Agree

To what extent do you feel that you have a good basis (enough information) to recognize
the thief from a photograph?
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

No basis at all

10
A very good basis

I am much better at remembering faces than I am at remembering names.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree

8

9

10

Strongly Agree
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Throughout the event I found myself getting distracted.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Disagree

8

9

10
Strongly Agree

89

VII. VITA
BRIAN S. CAHILL
2005

B.S., Psychology
Illinois State University
Normal, Illinois

2008

M.A., Experimental Psychology
University of Colorado at Colorado Springs
Colorado Springs, Colorado

2015

Ph.D., Legal Psychology
Florida International University
Miami, Florida

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
Cahill, B. S., & Coolidge, F. L. (2007, April). Adult ADHD and personality disorders:
Differential comorbidity among its subtypes. Paper presented at the meeting of the
Rocky Mountain Psychological Association, Denver, CO.
Cahill, B. S., Charman, S. D. (2011, March). On the nature of deliberative judgments in
eyewitness lineup identification tasks. Paper presented at the meeting of the
American Psychological Law Society, Miami, Fl.
Cahill, B. S., Coolidge, F. L., & Segal, D. L. (2006, April). Prevalence of ADHD and its
comorbidity in 3,090 prison inmates. Paper presented at the meeting of the Rocky
Mountain Psychological Association, Park City, UT
Cahill, B. S., Coolidge, F. L., & Segal, D. L. (2006, August). The psychometrics of an
adult ADHD scale in 3,090 prison inmates. Paper presented at the meeting of the
American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA
Cahill, B. S., Coolidge, F. L., & Segal, D. L. (2007, August). ADHD: Prevalence and
comorbidity in adult prison inmates. Paper presented at the meeting of the
American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.
Cahill, B. S., Coolidge, F. L., Segal, D. L., & Klebe, K. J. (2008, August). Psychometrics
of the Coolidge Correctional Inventory in 3,962 Prison Inmates. Paper presented
at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Boston, MA.
Cahill, B. S., Coolidge, F. L., Segal, D. L., Klebe, K. J., Marle, P. D., & Overmann, K. A.
(2012). Prevalence of ADHD, its subtypes, and comorbidity subtype differences in adult
prison inmates. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 30, 154-166.

90

Cahill, B. S., Fisher, R. P., & Rivard, J. J. (2011, March). Catching liars with cartoons.
Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Law Society,
Miami, Fl.
Cahill, B. S., Greene, E., Yochim, B. P., & Winter, R. J. (2009, March). The effects of
neuroscientific and neuropsychological expert testimony during the sentencing
phase of a capital case. Paper presented at the meeting of the American
Psychological Law Society, San Antonio, TX.
Charman, S. D. & Cahill, B. S. (2011, March). On the nature of automatic processes in
eyewitness lineup identification tasks. Paper presented at the meeting of the
American Psychological Law Society, Miami, Fl.
Charman, S. D. & Cahill, B. S. (2012). Witnesses' memories for lineup fillers postdicts their
identification accuracy. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 1, 11-17.

Charman, S. D., Cahill, B. S., Leins, D., & Carol, R. (2010, March). Investigating the
ability of innocent suspects to generate accurate alibis. Paper presented at the
meeting of the American Psychological Law Society, Vancouver, Canada.
Coolidge, F. L., & Cahill, B. S. (2007, August). Preliminary psychometric characteristics
of a child psychopathology brief-screening inventory. Paper presented at the
meeting of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.
Coolidge, F. L., Cahill, B. S., Segal, D. L., Yochim, B. P., Durham, R. L., & Coolidge, C.
M. (2007, August). Nightmares in children: Prevalence, heritability, and
comorbid psychopathology. Paper presented at the meeting of the American
Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.
Coolidge, F. L., Segal, D. L., Cahill, B. S., & Archuleta, J. L. (2008). A new five factor model of
psychopathology: Preliminary psychometric characteristics of the Five-Dimensional
Personality Test (5DPT). Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 1326-1334.
Coolidge, F. L., Segal, D. L., Cahill, B. S., & Simenson, J. T. (2010). Psychometric properties of
a brief inventory for the screening of personality disorders: The SCATI. Psychology and
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 83(4), 395-405.
Coolidge, F. L., Segal, D. L., Klebe, K. J., Cahill, B. S., & Whitcomb, J. M. (2009). Psychometric
properties of the Coolidge Correctional Inventory (CCI) in a sample of 3,962 prison
inmates. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 27, 713-726.
Coolidge, F. L., Starkey, M. S., & Cahill, B. S. (2007). A comparison of a parent-rated DSM-IV
measure of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder and quantitative
electroencephalograph parameters in an outpatient sample of children. Journal of Clinical
Neurophysiology, 24, 348-351.

91

